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We address the problem of improving bidders’ strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions.
We introduce a simple and generic method to design novel bidding strategies if the seller uses past bids to
optimize her mechanism. This strategy works with general value distributions, with asymmetric bidders and
for different revenue-maximizing mechanisms. Furthermore, it can be made robust to sample approximation
errors on the seller part. This results in a large increase in utility for bidders whether they have a full or partial
knowledge of their competitors.
1 INTRODUCTION
Auctions currently play a key role in the internet ecosystem through online advertising [2, 3, 6].
Ad slots are sold to advertisers by a publisher following more or less explicit mechanisms, i.e., a
type of auctions with specific rules. Those auctions take place on platforms called “ad exchanges”
[27], either in a multi-item fashion in the search setting or in a single-item fashion in the display
advertising setting. One of the most common type of auctions used in the later setting are the
classical second price auctions with reserve prices. They are myopically truthful, as it is dominant
for buyers to bid their true valuation at each individual auction, and even revenue-maximizing for
identical bidders [28, 31].
Since the influential paper of Myerson [28], the revenue-maximizing auction literature has
assumed that value distributions from the different bidders are common knowledge among the
seller and the bidders. The classical reasoning [2, 15] behind this traditional assumption is that the
seller is choosing incentive compatible auctions such as Vickrey auctions; “hence", since in a one
shot second price auction it is optimal to bid one’s own valuations, the seller can safely expect that
past bids reflect past valuations. An approximation of her distribution of valuations easily follows.
Then, to tackle the approximation error on the value distribution, a recent line of work has focused
on learning the optimal mechanism assuming the seller has access to a batch of i.i.d. examples of
bidders’ valuations [25, 30].
Several works have already shown that if bids are used in order to design the mechanism, the
bidders should no longer bid truthfully [1, 19, 24, 32]. However, they do not exhibit strategies
which work in the general setting with arbitrary value distributions and do not address cases where
bidders only have partial and noisy access to the competition’s distribution. Indeed, in practice, ad
platforms disclose little information to participants.
Our paper introduces a simple, general and robust method to design bidding strategies adaptive
to prior-dependent revenue maximizing auctions. This method works with very general value
distributions (e.g. non-regular distributions), asymmetries between bidders and various revenue
maximizing mechanisms. It also tackles practical settings where no prior information on the
competition is available. It should enable practitioners to easily improve their bidding strategies.
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1.1 Framework and related work
Starting with the seminal work of Myerson [28], a rich line of works indicates the type of auctions
that is revenue-maximizing for the seller. In the case of symmetric bidders [28], one revenue
maximizing auction is a second price auction with a reserve price equal to the monopoly price,
i.e, the price r that maximizes r (1 − F (r )) (F being the value distribution of the bidder). However,
in most applications, the symmetry assumption is not satisfied [15]. In the asymmetric case, the
Myerson auction is optimal [28] but difficult to implement in practice [26]. In this case, a second
price auction with well-chosen reserve prices guarantees at least 1/2 of the optimal revenue [17].
Revenue maximizing auctions play a big role in internet economy [23, 30] because there exists
a lot of heterogeneities between bidders and a low number of participants per auction [24]. In
this context, they have a clear impact on seller’s revenue since the ratio between revenues of the
Myerson auction (the optimal revenue-maximizing auction) and a second price auction without
reserve price (the welfare-maximizing auction) is of order 1 − 1/n with n the number of bidders [8].
Practical implementation of revenue-maximizing mechanisms requires that the seller knows
the bidder’s value distributions beforehand, which practically may not be the case. More precisely,
assume the valuation of a bidder vi ∈ R is drawn from a specific distribution Fi ; a bidding strategy
for bidder i is a mapping βi from R into R that indicates the actual bid Bi = βi (vi ) when the value is
vi . As a consequence, the distribution of bids FBi is the push-forward of Fi by βi . We can highlight
different classes of auction problems depending on the information available to the seller that she
might use to optimize her mechanism.
(S1) Fi is known to the seller. This is the traditional setting studied in Myerson’s seminal paper
[28] where he assumed that {Fi }’s are common knowledge to the bidders and the seller.
(S2) FBi is known to the seller. It is an idealized setting where the seller has no uncertainty about
FBi , e.g. because she receives an infinity of i.i.d. bids from the buyers.
(S3) the seller has only access to a finite number of examples of bids. She can only compute an
approximation of FBi denoted by FˆBi . This is the most realistic case.
The last setting (S3) best describes real-world practice and the objective of most of mechanisms
is to make sure that bidders are truthful. Indeed, the bid distribution is then equal to the value
distribution and the seller is back to the full information setting (S1) required to implement
revenue-maximizing mechanisms. Hence, designing incentive compatible mechanisms is a crucial
requirement to elicit the bidders’ private value distributions. The remaining question of empirical
estimation was theoretically addressed by [10, 11, 18] looking at the sample complexity of a large
class of auctions assuming access to i.i.d. examples of the value distribution.
In order to design such incentive compatible mechanisms, sellers have been relying on different
assumptions. In the traditional setting of auction theory, sellers assume that bidders are myopic
and do not optimize their long term-utility [29, 30]. However, in the context of internet auctions,
given the volume and repetition of auctions, sellers cannot assume myopic behavior by the bidders.
In this context, one needs to account for the dependency introduced by the seller on the bidder
strategy when using past bids to adapt the mechanism (for instance by optimizing the reserve price).
In such case, non-myopic bidders optimizing their long-term expected utility have an incentive
to be strategic against this adaptation of the mechanism. To solve this issue, [4, 14, 24] exhibited
mechanisms that are incentive compatible (up to a small number of bids) under the assumption
that bidders are almost myopic or impatient – i.e. they have a fixed discount on future utilities.
Unfortunately, it comes at the cost of introducing an asymmetry between the bidders having a
discounted long-term utility, and the seller having an undiscounted long-term revenue (infinitely
patient). Another way to prevent the bidders from being strategic, is to adapt the mechanism (e.g.
reserve price) based on the competition of a bidder rather than based on the bidder itself [5, 13, 19].
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A limitation of this type of approach is the need to rely on a (partial) symmetry of the bidders: any
bidder has some competitors with (almost) the same value distribution as her. In particular and
as noticed in [13], it cannot handle the existence of any dominant buyer, i.e., a buyer with higher
values than the other bidders. This is a limited setting as revenue-optimizing mechanisms are
mostly needed when the buyers are heterogenous. In the real-world setting of online advertising,
with asymmetric bidders and no specific asymmetry between seller and buyers on future utilities,
none of these mechanisms ends up being able to enforce truthful bidding. This is illustrated by
recent work proposing a method to empirically detect when a mechanism is not truthful from the
point of view of a non-myopic bidder [21]. In this setting, this leaves us with an important question:
What should “good" bidders’ strategies be?
From a bidder’s standpoint, none of these papers have exhibited strategies that can be used in
the general case when the seller is optimizing her mechanism based on past bids. A suboptimal
strategy in the case of two bidders with uniform distribution that increases the utility of the bidder
has been introduced in [19]. Some Bayes-Nash equilibria corresponding to games where bidders
can choose their bid distribution were designed [1, 32] with some derivations of seller revenue and
bidders utility at these equilibria. However, no strategies corresponding to these equilibria were
provided in the general case.
1.2 Main contributions
We introduce a method to derive strategies for the bidder in the context of a seller using her past
bids to adapt the mechanism towards a revenue-optimization objective. We mainly focus in this
paper on the case where the mechanisms are lazy second price auctions with monopoly reserve
price and extend some of the results to other classes of auctions such as the Myerson auction or the
eager second price auction with monopoly price. More formally, we propose a steady-state analysis
with the seller optimizing the reserve prices according to FBi or FˆBi . We assume that bidders are
risk-neutral and seek to maximize their utility based on the information available to them:
(B1) either they know the class of mechanisms they are facing, their own value distribution and
the bid distribution of the competition (i.e. the distribution of the maximum bid of their
competitors.)
(B2) or they know the class of mechanisms they are facing and only their own distribution Fi .
They do not have any side information. This is the realistic problem corresponding to internet
auctions since in practice ad platforms disclose scarce information.
Based on this classification of auction problems, we introduce the following practical objective :
bidders aim at maximizing in the “long run” their own expected utility given that they know the
class of mechanisms used by the auctioneer, their own value distribution and that their bids might
be used to optimize the mechanism.
In the steady state analysis, the seller uses the distributions of bids FBi to choose a specific
auction mechanismM(FBi ) among a given class of mechanismsM. The objective of a long-term
strategic bidder is to find her strategy βi that maximizes her expected utility when vi ∼ Fi , she bids
βi (vi ) and the induced mechanism isM(FBi ). This steady-state objective is particularly relevant
in modern applications as most of the data-driven selling mechanisms are using large batches of
bids as examples to update their mechanism. In terms of game theory, these interactions are a
game between the seller - whose strategy is to pick a mechanism design that maps bid distributions
to reserve prices - and the bidders - who chose bidding strategies. Our overarching objective is
to derive the best-response (or at least provably improved response), for a given bidder i , to the
strategy of the seller (i.e. a given mechanism) and to the strategies of the other bidders (i.e. their
bid distributions) up to available knowledge on the competition.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provide a walkthrough of the main technical ideas
supporting our work to provably improve the response of one bidder independently from the
behavior and knowledge of other bidders. This models the situation where other bidders are not
able to implement complex bidding strategies, for instance because of technological limitations. This
theoretical study introduces a practical method to design bidding strategies in revenue-maximizing
auctions that we call thresholding the virtual value. In Section 3, we improve over the strategy in
the case when information about competition’s bid distribution is available to provide the best
response in the class of thresholded strategies. In Section 4, we address the important theoretical
question of existence and uniqueness of symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium where all the bidders
strategically optimize their expected utility, assuming the symmetric setting where they all have
the same value distribution. We compute strategies corresponding to some Bayes-Nash equilibria
in this game, depending on the class of possible strategies considered by the bidders. For the class
of thresholded strategies, these equilibria cancel the information advantage of the seller. Bidders
recover at equilibrium the utility they get in a second price auction with no reserve price and
with their initial value distribution. In Section 5.1, we show our results can be made robust to
sample-approximation error by the seller, tackling the case where only an estimator FˆB is available
to the seller. In Section 5.2, we prove the same strategies naturally extends to other mechanisms,
namely the Myerson auction and the eager second price auction with monopoly price, which are
both natural alternative mechanisms to a lazy second price auction in our context.
Our analysis is based on a new variational approach that opens avenues for research to design
bidding strategies in various complex data-driven mechanisms. We finally report the performance
of the different strategies for several value distributions using common examples found in auction
textbooks or the corresponding academic literature.
One of our results details some bidding strategies that do not have any short-term impact
for the bidders and dramatically increase their utility when they are facing revenue-maximizing
mechanisms. This is a new argument supporting the claim that practical mechanisms should not
be prior-dependent [35].
2 IMPROVING BIDDING STRATEGIES WITHOUT COMPETITION KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we show how to improve the strategy of one bidder when she does not have any
information about the competition. We assume that the strategies of the other bidders are fixed
and do not depend on the bidder’s strategy. The seller is learning optimal reserve prices based
on past bids assuming they are i.i.d samples of bidders’ value distribution. We assume that the
seller has perfect knowledge of the bid distributions to choose the mechanism. We relax this latter
assumption in Section 5.
We first introduce the Myerson lemma in our setting to compute the expected utility of the
strategic bidder.We then show on an example why truthful bidding can be improved by thresholding
the virtual value. Using the Myerson’s lemma and two other technical lemmas, we prove that this
strategy provides a higher utility for the bidder while keeping her payment unchanged. It also
provides an incentive for the seller to decrease the reserve price to the minimum bid of the new bid
distribution.
2.1 Notations and setting
We recall that Fi is the value distribution of bidder i and βi : R → R her strategy that maps
values to bids. The corresponding distribution of bids is then FBi = βi ♯Fi , the push-forward
of Fi w.r.t. βi . Notice that we have implicitly identified the distribution Fi (resp. FBi ) with its
cumulative distribution function (cdf) and use both terms exchangeably. We use fi (resp. fBi ) for
the corresponding probability density function (pdf).
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We denote byψBi the corresponding virtual value function defined as
ψBi (b) = b −
1 − FBi (b)
fBi (b)
.
We assume that the seller runs a lazy second price auction with monopoly reserve price computed
according to the distribution of bids she is observing or knows. We recall that in a “lazy” second
price auction, the item is attributed to the highest bidder, if she clears her reserve price, and
not attributed otherwise; the winner then pays the maximum of the second highest bid and her
reserve price. It is known that the optimal reserve price of bidder i is the monopoly price equal to
argmaxr r (1 − FBi (r )), or equivalently1 toψ−1Bi (0), whereψBi is the usual virtual value.
2.2 The fundamental Myerson lemma
Myerson’s lemma [28] is a fundamental result in auction theory. We denote below byGi the cdf
of the maximum bid of players other than i; obviously, if the other bidders are truthful, Gi is the
distribution of the maximum value of the other bidders.
Lemma 1 (Integrated version of the Myerson lemma). Assume that FBi has a density and
finite mean. Suppose that i’s bids are independent of the bids of the other bidders and denote by Gi the
cdf of the maximum of their bids. Suppose a lazy second price auction with reserve price for bidder i
denoted by r is run. Then the paymentMi of bidder i to the seller can be expressed as
Mi (βi ) = EBi∼FBi
(
ψBi (Bi )Gi (Bi )1(Bi ≥ r )
)
.
If the other bidders are bidding truthfully, Gi is the distribution of the maximum value of the other
bidders.
The formal proof is in Appendix D.1. Lemma 1 yields that it is enough to consider the virtual
value to deduce the payment in the lazy second price auction. This explains why the optimal reserve
price is equal toψ−1Bi (0) whenψBi crosses 0 exactly once and is positive beyond that crossing point
(that is of course the case when ψBi is increasing) : the derivative of Mi (βi ) with respect to the
reserve price r has the opposite sign as that ofψBi (r ).
Using the notations introduced previously, it is optimal for the seller to choose as reserve price
for bidder i the monopoly price corresponding to her bid distribution, and Lemma 1 implies that
the expected payment of bidder i in the optimized lazy second price auction is equal to
Mi (βi ) = EB∼FBi
(
ψFBi (B)Gi (B)1(B ≥ ψ−1Bi (0))
)
.
In order to simplify the computation of the expectation and remove the dependence on Bi , we
rewrite this expected payment in the space of values using the fact that the strategic bidder is using
an increasing strategy βi . To do so, we define:
hβi (x) ≜ ψFBi (βi (x))
With this new notation, we can rewrite the expected payment of the strategic bidder i
Mi (βi ) = EXi∼Fi
(
hβi (Xi )Gi (βi (Xi ))1(Xi ≥ xβ )
)
.
and derive her expected utility as a function of βi as
U (βi ) = EXi∼Fi
(
(Xi − hβi (Xi ))Gi (βi (Xi ))1(Xi ≥ xβ )
)
. (1)
1at least for regular distributions, i.e., when ψ is increasing
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We call xβ the reserve value. It is the smallest value above which the seller accepts all bids from
bidder i . If hβi crosses 0 exactly once and is positive beyond that crossing point, xβ = h−1βi (0). If we
note ri = ψ−1FBi (0) the reserve price of bidder i and βi increasing , the reserve value is equal to β
−1
i (ri ).
If we consider only increasing differentiable (except perhaps at finitely many points) strategies,
and we denote by I the class of such functions, the problem of the strategic bidder is therefore
to solve supβ ∈I U (β) withU defined in Equation (1). This equation is crucial, as it indicates that
optimizing over bidding strategy can be reduced to finding a distribution with a well-specified
hβ (·).
A crucial difference between the long term vision and the classical, myopic (or one-shot) auction
theory is that in our setup bidders maximize expected utility globally over the full support of the
value distribution. In the classical myopic setting, bidders determine their bids so as tomaximize their
expected utility at each value. In our setup, the strategic bidder also accounts for the computation
of the reserve price, a function of her global bid distribution. She might therefore be willing to
sometime over-bid (incurring a negative utility at some specific auctions/values) if this reduces her
reserve price. Indeed, having a lower reserve price increases the utility of other auctions. Lose small
to win big. This reasoning makes sense only with multiple interactions between bidders and seller.
2.3 Thresholding the virtual value
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Fig. 1. Virtual value of truthful bidder vs. strategic bidder. The value distribution of the bidder is
U([0, 1]), the standard textbook example used for the sake of illustration. Her virtual value is therefore equal
toψ (x) = 2x − 1, and is represented by the blue line. The dashed red vertical line corresponds to the current
reserve price. The green area corresponds to the bidder’s payment if we picked G = 1, i.e. no competition,
for the sake of clarity of the plot. The left-hand side corresponds to truthful bidding, the right-hand side to
strategic behavior. In both cases, the blue line corresponds toψB .
To explain why we can easily improve a bidding strategy, let us describe the following elemen-
tary example (see also Figures 1, 5 and 6 for graphical illustrations). We consider that the value
distribution of the bidder is uniform between 0 and 1 (U([0, 1])) (a standard example in [20], see e.g.
Example 2.1 and subsequent chapters). If the strategic bidder were bidding truthfully, her virtual
value would be negative below 0.5 and the seller would set the reserve price to 0.5. What would
happen if the bidder were able to send a virtual value equal to zero below 0.5? Then the seller
would not have any incentives to block some of the bids since the virtual value is non-negative
everywhere. Notice that, since the virtual value is zero below 0, the seller receives exactly the same
expected payment as in the previous setup.
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We define a welfare-benevolent seller as a seller such that when indifferent between two reserve
prices, she chooses the lowest one, i.e, the one yielding the maximum welfare. This is a standard
assumption in game theory. In the framework where the seller has a cost to sell the item [7], it
corresponds to a cost-to-sell of zero. If the seller is not benevolent, instead of looking for a strategy
such thatψB (x) = 0 on [0.0.5], the buyer will try to satisfyψB (x) = ϵ with ϵ small. In that case the
seller has a strict incentive to take all bids and hence lower the reserve price.
We call this technique thresholding the virtual value: finding a bidding strategy such that
the virtual value of the induced distribution is equal to zero (or to a threshold ϵ , for arbitrary small
ϵ > 0 if the seller is not welfare benevolent) below the current reserve price.
We now prove formally why it is possible to find a bidding strategy such that the virtual value
of the induced bid distribution is equal to zero below a certain threshold.
2.4 Deriving formally the corresponding bidding strategy
2.4.1 Technical lemmas. Before carrying on with reasoning on the virtual value, such as in our
motivating example, we need to ensure we can find the corresponding strategy βi that will expose
a bid distribution FBi with the corresponding virtual value. The two following technical lemmas
show how to deduce βi from a given hβi .
Lemma 2. Suppose Bi = βi (Xi ), where βi is increasing and differentiable and Xi is a random
variable with cdf Fi and pdf fi . Then
hβi (xi ) ≜ βi (x) − β ′i (x)
1 − Fi (x)
fi (x) = ψFBi (βi (x)) . (2)
Proof. ψFBi (b) = b −
1−FBi (b)
fBi (b) with FBi (b) = Fi (β
−1
i (b)) and fBi (b) = fi (β−1i (b)/β ′i (β−1i (b).
Then, hβi (x) = ψBi (βi (x)) = βi (x) − β ′i (x) 1−Fi (x )fi (x ) . □
The second lemma shows that for any function д we can find a function β such that hβ = д.
Lemma 3. Let X be a random variable with cdf F and pdf f . Assume that f > 0 on the support of
X . Let x0 in the support of X , C ∈ R and д : R→ R. lf we note
βд(x) =
C(1 − F (x0)) −
∫ x
x0
д(u)f (u)du
1 − F (x) . (3)
Then, if B = βд(X ),
hβд (x) = д(x) and βд(x0) = C .
If x0 ≤ t and д is non-decreasing on [x0, t], β ′д(x) ≥ (C−д(x))(1−F (x0))f (x)/(1−F (x)) for x ∈ [x0, t].
Hence βд is increasing on [x0, t] if д is non-decreasing and д < C .
Proof. The result follows by simply differentiating the expression for βд , and plugging-in the
expression for hβд obtained in Lemma 2. The result on the derivative is simple algebra. □
2.4.2 Improving bidder’s response without competition knowledge. The two technical lemmas 2
and 3 show that for any function д non-decreasing, we can find a strategy βi such that the bid
distribution induced by using βi on FXi verifiesψBi (βi (x)) = д(x) for all x in the support of FXi .
In Section 2.3, we explained why sending a virtual value equal to zero when the initial one was
negative increases the bidder’s expected utility. To derive the corresponding bidding strategy β
from the virtual value, we need to solve the simple ODE defined in Lemma 2. More formally, the
following theorem shows how to improve any strategy assuming the bidder knows the current
reserve price or value, which were computed to maximize bidders’ payment using Myerson’s
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Lemma above. This theorem still holds for non-regular value distributions and in the asymmetric
case when the bidders have different value distributions.
Theorem 1. Consider the one-strategic setting in a lazy second price auction with FXi the value
distribution of the strategic bidder i with a seller computing the reserve prices to maximize her revenue.
Suppose βr is an increasing strategy with associated reserve value r > 0. Then there exists β˜r such that:
1) The reserve value associated with β˜r is 0. 2) Ui (β˜r ) ≥ Ui (βr ), Ui being the utility of the strategic
bidder. 3) Ri (β˜r ) ≥ Ri (βr ), Ri being the payment of bidder i to the seller. The following continuous
functions fulfill these conditions for ϵ ≥ 0 small enough:
β˜ (ϵ )r (x) =
( [βr (r ) − ϵ](1 − FXi (r ))
1 − FXi (x)
+ ϵ
)
1x<r + βr (x)1x ≥r
The formal proof in the general case is in Appendix D.2. We provide a sketch of proof for
the simpler case of regular distributions and when the initial strategy βr is the identity function
corresponding to truthful bidding. In this case, r is equal to the monopoly price of FXi . Figure 5 in
Appendix A illustrates the seller point of view once the thresholding strategy is applied.
Proof: Important special case of βr (x) = x ; general case in Appendix D.2. Weassumed that
the seller computes the reserve price to maximize her revenue. Hence r = argmaxx(1 − FXi (x)). In
this case,
∫ r
0 ψi (xi )G(xi )fi (xi )dxi ≤ 0 (otherwise the reserve price would be lower and since the
payment of bidder i is equal to
∫ +∞
r ψi (xi )G(xi )fi (xi )dxi .
β˜ (ϵ )r defined in Theorem 1 verifies theODE defined in Lemma 3 such thath β˜ (ϵ )r (x) = ψB β˜ (ϵ )r (β˜r
(ϵ )(x)) =
ϵ for x ∈ [0, r ] and h β˜ (ϵ ) (x) = ψXi (x) for x ∈ [r ,+∞]. β˜ (ϵ )r is trivially increasing.
Hence, the virtual value of the distribution induced by β˜ (ϵ )r is non-negative on [0, r ] and the new
reserve value is equal to zero. The new reserve price is therefore equal to the minimum bid of
bidder i and
Ri (β˜ (ϵ )r ) = Ri (βr ) + EXi∼Fi
(
ϵGi (β˜ (ϵ )r (Xi ))1(Xi ≤ r )
)
≥ Ri (βr ) .
The new bidder’s utility is
Ui (β˜ (ϵ )r ) = Ui (βr ) + EXi∼Fi
(
(Xi − ϵ)Gi (β˜ (ϵ )r (Xi ))1(Xi ≤ r )
)
For ϵ = 0 we have clearlyU (β˜ (ϵ )r ) ≥ U (βr ) and Ri (β˜ (ϵ )r ) = Ri (βr ). Outside pathological cases, it is
a strict inequality and by continuity with respect to ϵ , i.e. assuming G continuous, it is true in a
neighborhood of zero so for some ϵ > 0. □
This theorem shows that it is always possible for a strategic bidder to find a strategy with a
reserve value equal to zero in a lazy second price auction. We recall that the reserve price is the
image of the reserve value by the bidding strategy. Hence, a reserve value equal to zero implies
that the reserve price of the strategic bidder is equal to her minimum bid. This minimum bid is
equal to 0.25 in the case of a bidder with a uniform value distribution.
This improvement of bidder’s utility does not depend of the estimation of the competition and
thus can easily be implemented in practice. We call the technique thresholding the virtual value at
the monopoly price. We plot in Figure 2, the bidding strategy β˜ (0)0.5 when the initial value distribution
isU[0, 1] and the virtual value of the bid distribution induced by β˜ (0)0.5 onU[0, 1]. We recall that
the monopoly price corresponding toU[0, 1] is equal to 0.5. We remark that the strategy consists
in overbidding below the monopoly price of the initial value distribution. The strategic bidder is
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Fig. 2. The strategic bidder has a uniform distribution as value distribution. On the left hand side,
we plot the new thresholded strategy compared to the traditional truthful strategy when the pri-
vate value distribution is U[0, 1]. On the right hand side, we display the virtual value of the bid
distribution induced by the thresholded strategy on the uniform value distribution. The reserve
price of the thresholded strategy is equal to 0.25 (corresponding to a reserve value of 0) whereas the reserve
price of the truthful strategy is equal to 0.5. (corresponding to a reserve value of 0.5). The green area represents
the payment corresponding to the thresholded strategy (we assumed G = 1 for the sake of clarity).
ready to increase pointwise her payment when she wins auctions with low values in order to get
a large decrease of the reserve price (going from 0.5 to 0.25) Globally, the payment of the bidder
remains unchanged compared to when the bidder was bidding truthfully with a reserve price equal
to 0.5. Thresholding the virtual value at the monopoly price amounts to overbidding below the
monopoly price, effectively providing over the course of the auctions an extra payment to the
seller in exchange for lowering the reserve price/value faced by the strategic bidder. This strategy
unlocks a very substantial utility gain for the bidder. In the Appendix ?? we provide a plot that
illustrate and explain the increase in utility for the strategic bidder.
2.5 Impact on bidder’s utility
Naturally, a key question is to understand the impact of this new strategy on the utility of the
strategic bidder. We compare the situation with two bidders bidding truthfully against an optimal
reserve price and the new situation with one bidder using the thresholded strategy and the second
one bidding truthfully. We assume, as is standard in many textbooks and research papers numerical
examples, that their value distribution isU[0, 1].
Then, elementary computation show that in this specific illustrative example
• the strategic bidder utility increases from 0.083 to 0.132, (a 57% increase.)
• the welfare increases from 0.583 to 0.632. (a 8% increase)
These figures, which we computed analytically, can also be independently confirmed with a simple
simulator playing auctions between a strategic bidder, a truthful bidder and a seller who is computing
the reserve price of each bidder by maximizing ri (1 − FBi (ri )). In this example, as the initial reserve
prices of the bidders are the same, we also remark that the utility of the truthful bidder and the
global revenue of the seller remain unchanged.
With a log-normal distribution (which is widely used to model value distributions in online
advertising) with parameters µ = 0.25 and σ = 1, the utility of the strategic bidders goes from 0.791
to 1.025 (a 29.5% increase). The utility in a second price with no reserve price is equal to 1.100 (see
Appendix C for more details).
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In the next section, we show that this strategy can be improved if the bidder has access to the
distribution of the maximum bid of the competition. Moreover, we study the case where all bidders
are strategic, and we exhibit Nash equilibria.
3 BIDDER’S BEST RESPONSE WITH COMPETITION KNOWLEDGE
The formulation introduced in the previous section offers a way to consider auction problems as
functional-analytic problems and provides an alternative to game-theoretic methods used to derive
optimal strategies and equilibria. We now extend the result of the previous section to the case
where the strategic bidder has access to the distribution of the highest bid of the competition.
3.1 A variational form of bidder’s utility
We presented in the previous section a direct way to compute the expected utility of a bidding
strategy βi when the seller is using a second price auction with personalized reserve price and the
other bidders are bidding truthfully:
U (βi ) = EX∼Fi
(
(X − hβi (X ))Gi (β(X ))1(X ≥ xβi )
)
. (4)
with hβi (x) = βi (x) − β ′i (x)
1−FXi (x )
fXi (x ) and xβi = h
−1
βi
(0). In this section, we assume that the bidder has
now access to the distribution of the highest bid of the competition that we denote by Gi (дi being
the associated pdf). In the following, unless otherwise stated, the expectation is taken according to
the value distribution of the bidder. In order to be able to derive optimal strategies, we take the
directional derivative of the previous expression and obtain the following lemma (we remove the
subscript i as it is now clear we consider bidder i).
Lemma 4. Suppose we change β into βt = β + tρ. Both β and βt are assumed to be non-decreasing.
Call xβ the reserve value corresponding to β , assume it has the property thathβ (xβ ) = 0 andh′β (xβ ) , 0
(h′β is assumed to exist locally). Assume xβ is the unique global maximizer of the revenue of the seller.
Then,
∂
∂t
U (βt )

t=0
=E
(
д(β(X ))[X − β(X )]ρ(X )1[X ≥xβ ]
)
+G(β(xβ ))
[
xβ f (xβ )/h′β (xβ ) − (1 − F (xβ ))
]
ρ(xβ )
− ρ ′(xβ )xβ (1 − F (xβ ))G(β(xβ ))/h′β (xβ ) .
The formal proof is in Appendix E.1. This variational form can be used to derive optimal bidding
strategies in various class of functions.
3.2 Improving the strategies with competition knowledge
When bidder i knows the distribution of the maximum bid of the competition denoted by Gi , she
can optimize her strategy over various class of functions. We still assume that the distribution
of the competition does not depend on bidder i strategy. We first provide a result on the class of
linear strategies since it might be the simplest class of bidding strategies. Then, we show how the
thresholded strategy introduced in the previous section can be optimized knowing the distribution
of the maximum bid of the competition.
Optimal linear strategy. If bidder i is a strategic bidder, βi (x) = αx , hence ρ(x) = x and the
first order conditions for the optimal α , α∗ reduces to the non-linear equation:
(1 − α∗)E
(
дi (α∗Xi )X 2i 1[Xi ≥ψ −1Xi (0)]
)
= ψ−1Xi (0)(1 − Fi (ψ−1Xi (0)))Gi (α∗ψ−1Xi (0)) .
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Example: If bidder i hasU([0, 1]) distribution, we get α∗ = 710 . We use similar computations to
compute optimal linear strategies for any number of competitors as depicted in Figure 3.
Class of thresholded strategies. We can optimize among the strategies with thresholded
virtual values that we introduced in Section 2. We define more formally this class of bidding
strategies.
Definition 2 (Thresholded bidding strategies). A bidding strategy β is called a thresholded bidding
strategy if and only if there exists r > 0 such that for all x < r ,hβ (x) = ψB (β(x)) = 0. This family
of functions can be parametrized with
β
γ
r (x) =
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x) 1[x<r ] + γ (x)1[x ≥r ] ,
with r ∈ R and γ : R→ R strictly increasing.
This class of continuous bidding strategies has two degrees of freedom : the threshold r such that
for all x < r ,hβ (x) = 0 and the strategy γ used beyond the threshold. We do not restrict the class
of functions of γ that can be used beyond the threshold. All the strategies defined in this class have
the property to have a reserve value equal to zero, i.e. their reserve price is equal to their minimum
bid, when the seller is welfare benevolent and the virtual value of γ is positive beyond r . We show
that there exists an optimal threshold r for the strategic bidder that depends on the competition and
that the optimal strategy to use for x > r is to be truthful. The next lemma computes this optimal
thresholded strategy by deriving a variant of Lemma 4 in the class of thresholded strategies.
Lemma 5. Suppose that only one bidder is strategic, let G denote the CDF of the maximum value of
the competition and g the corresponding pdf. Denote byU (βγr ) the utility of the bidder using the strategy
β
γ
r according to the parametrization of Definition 2. Assume that the seller is welfare-benevolent. Then
if βt = β
γ+tρ
r ,
∂U (βt )
∂t

t=0
= E
(
(X − γ (X ))д(γ (X ))ρ(X )1[X ≥r ]
)
+ ρ(r )
(1 − F (r ))
(
E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
−G(γ (r ))
)
∂U (βγr )
∂r
= − hβ (r )f (r )
(
E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
−G(γ (r ))
)
The only strategy γ and threshold r for which we can cancel the derivatives in all directions ρ consists
in bidding truthfully beyond r ∗, where r ∗ satisfies the equation
G(r ∗) = E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
r ∗(1 − F (r ∗))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ∗]
)
.
Proof. Applying similar ideas to those of Lemma 4 to the thresholded bidding strategies give
the two equations of the lemma. Solving the second one gives the optimal threshold r ∗. To show
that bidding truthfully is optimal after r ∗, it suffices to remark that to satisfy
E
(
(X − γ (X ))д(γ (X ))ρ(X )1[X ≥r ]
)
= 0
for all directions ρ, we need for x > r , γ (x) = x . The complete proof is in Appendix E.2. □
There could exist better strategies leading to higher utility for the bidder. However, a more
involved or optimal shading function would create multiple local optima for the seller revenue
derived from the strategic bidder. In order to understand the properties of all the local optima, the
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Fig. 3. Left: Utility of the strategic bidder depending on its shading function and the number of
players. Right: Corresponding bidding profile strategies in the case of two players. All bidders have
as value distribution a uniform distribution on [0,1]. The payoff are computed with averaging the payoff
over 100,000 runs of the auction system. The “truthful thresholded" strategy corresponds to the strategy
introduced in Section 2 where the threshold corresponds to the monopoly price of Fi .
seller would have to look at her revenue for all possible values of the reserve price, which is not
guaranteed to happen in practice and requires a global optimization. On the other hand, if the seller
only optimizes the reserve price locally, with the bidding strategies presented above, she has an
incentive to decrease it at each step of the optimization.
We provide in Appendix I some KKT style computations about optimizing a bidding strategy
below the reserve price (assuming truthful bidding beyond the monopoly price). Because our
problem involves optimization in function space (in our case the Hilbert space H 1 = W 1,2, i.e.
a Sobolev space) with infinitely many constraints, a number of technical issues that are non-
problematic in finite dimension arise (see [33]) andwe do not address all of them in full mathematical
rigor. However, essentially assuming that we can proceed using a natural extension of the classical
finite problem with finitely many constraints, we check that the thresholding strategy verifies a
natural extension of the KKT necessity conditions and that other (non-pathological) strategies may
not. This already involves a large amount of technical work and these computations are informative
as they suggest that thresholding the virtual value is also a natural strategy from an optimization
standpoint.
Some numerical results We consider the situation where we have 1 strategic bidder, and 1
non-strategic one, both withU[0, 1] value distribution. We recall that the strategy introduced in
Section 2 was to bid truthfully beyond the monopoly price (r = .5 here) and using Theorem 1 before.
This strategy yields a utility of 0.1316, a 57% increase over the standard truthful bidding revenue.
The optimal strategy coming out of Lemma 5 consists in bidding truthfully beyond r ≃ .8 and using
the thresholding completion before. The utility is then around 0.1468, a 76% percent increase in
bidder utility compared to bidding truthfully (truthful bidding yields a utility of 1/12 ≃ .083). This
second strategy yields a higher utility for the strategic bidder but requires some knowledge of the
competition, though.
We plot the performance of the different strategies depending on number of bidders in Figure 3.
4 RESTRICTED BAYES-NASH SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA
We have only discussed so far the situation where one bidder is strategic and the other bidders do not
directly react to this strategy. It is a reasonable assumption in practice since the number of bidders
able to implement sophisticated bidding strategies appears to be limited. Now, we investigate the
case where all bidders are strategic. We assume that they all have the same value distribution FX .
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We exhibit a very large class of strategies in which there exists a unique Nash equilibrium where
the bidders recover the utility they get in a second price auction without reserve price.
More formally, the game we are considering is the following: all bidders have the same value
distribution FX . The mechanism is a lazy second price auction with reserve price equal to the
monopoly price of bidders’ bid distributions. We denote by β1, ..., βn the bidding strategies used by
each player and byUi (β1, ..., βn) the utility of bidder i when using βi . We say that strategy β is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium for this game if for all bidding strategies βˆ and for all bidders i , if all
players except bidder i are using β ,
Ui (β , ..., βˆ , ..., β) ≤ Ui (β, ..., β , ..., β)
We can reuse the same type of formulas we introduced in the previous subsection to compute the
expected utility of each bidder. We focus on bidder i . We note Gβ the distribution of the maximum
bid of the competitors of bidder i . The distribution of the highest bid of the competition depends
now on the strategy of bidder i. With this notation,
Ui (β, ..., βˆ, ..., β) = E
(
(X − h βˆ (X ))Gβ (βˆ(X ))1(X ≥ h−1βˆ (0))
)
.
As in the previous setting, we can compute directional derivatives when βˆ = β + tρ. We can find
different sorts of Bayes-Nash equilibria depending on the class of function bidders are optimizing
in. We call them restricted Nash equilibrium since they are equilibrium in a restricted class of
bidding strategies. In practice, bidders may not be able or willing to implement all possible bidding
strategies. They often limit themselves to strategies that are easy to practically implement.
We have obtained results on restricted Nash equilibria when the bidders restrict themselves to
the class of linear shading or affine shading, though we do not present them here as they are a bit
tangential to the main thrust of this paper. We detail the results on a larger and more interesting
class of functions: the class of thresholded bidding strategies that we introduced in Definition 2.
We assume that bidders can choose any strategies in this large class of functions. We can state a
directional derivative result in this class of strategies by directionally-differentiating the expression
of Ui (β , ..., βt , ..., β). As in the one-strategic case, it implies the only strategy with 0 “gradient" in
this class is truthful beyond a value r (r is different from the one in strategic case), where r can be
determined through a non-linear equation.
Lemma 6. Consider the symmetric setting. Suppose that all the bidders are strategic and that they
are all except one using the strategy β , Gβ denotes the CDF of the maximum bid of the competition
when they use β and дβ the corresponding pdf, consider r and γ such that β = β
γ
r . Assuming that the
seller is welfare-benevolent and that β ti = β
γ+tρ
r . Then
∂U (β, ..., β ti , ..., β)
∂t

t=0
= E
(
(X − γ (X ))дβ (γ (X ))ρ(X )1[X ≥r ]
)
+ ρ(r )
(1 − F (r ))
(
E
(
X
1 − F (X )дβ
(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
−Gβ (γ (r ))
)
Also,
∂U (β , ..., βi , ..., β)
∂r
= −hβ (r )f (r )
(
E
(
X
1 − F (X )дβ
(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
−Gβ (γ (r ))
)
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The only strategy γ and threshold r for which we can cancel the derivatives in all directions ρ consists
in bidding truthfully beyond r ∗all , where r
∗
all satisfies the equation
K − 1
r ∗all (1 − F (r ∗all ))
E
(
XFK−2(X )(1 − F (X ))1[X ≤r ∗all ]
)
= FK−1(r ∗all ) . (5)
Proof. To derive the lemma we need to do the same calculations as in the previous case (see
Appendix E.2) but now the distribution of the highest bid of the competition Gβ depends on β . In
the case of K symmetric bidders with the same value distributions F , we have
Gβ (x) = FK−1(β−1(x)) and дβ (β(x)) = (K − 1)F
K−2(x)
β ′(x) f (x) .
The last result follows by plugging-in these expressions in the corresponding equations. □
We show that this strategy represents the unique symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the class
of shading functions defined in Definition 2. At this equilibrium, the bidders recover the utility
they would get in a second price auction without reserve price.
Lemma 7. Suppose X has a distribution for whichψX crosses 0 exactly once and is positive beyond
that crossing point. Then Equation (5) has a unique non-zero solution.
The proof is in Appendix F.1. This lemma leads to our second main theorem proving that there
exists one unique symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the class of thresholded strategies. In this
equilibrium, bidders gets the utility they receive in a second price auction without reserve price.
Theorem 3. We consider the symmetric setting where all the bidders have the same value distribu-
tions. We assume for simplicity that the distribution is supported on [0,1]. Suppose this distribution has
density that is continuous at 0 and 1 with f (1) , 0 and follows the assumptions of Lemma 7.
There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the class of thresholded bidding strategies defined
in Definition 2. It is found by solving Equation (5) to determine r ∗ and bidding truthfully beyond r ∗
Moreover, if all the bidders are playing this strategy corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium,
the revenue of the seller is the same as in a second price auction with no reserve price. The same is true
of the utility of the buyers.
The formal proof is in Appendix F.2.
With appropriate shading functions, the bidders can recover the utility they would get when the
seller was not optimizing her mechanism to maximize her revenue. Nevertheless, this equilibrium
can be weakly collusive since we restrict ourselves to the class of functions introduced in Definition
2. It is not obvious that the strategy exhibited in Theorem 6 is an equilibrium in a larger class of
functions. However, as mentioned previously, from a practical standpoint, as of now there exists no
other clear way to increase drastically bidders utility that is independent from a precise estimation
of the competition. The fact that at symmetric equilibrium bidders recover the same utility as in
a second price auction with no reserves arguably makes it an even more natural class of bidding
strategies to consider from the bidder standpoint.
5 ROBUSTNESS OF THE STRATEGIES
5.1 Robustness to some approximation error of the seller
We now turn to some robustness questions, motivated by the fact that the seller needs to estimate
the distribution of the buyer and hence does not have perfect knowledge of the bid distribution
FBi . Hence, the buyer needs to find a robust shading method, making sure that the seller has an
incentive to lower her reserve prices, even if she misestimates the bid distribution of the buyer.
We callψF the virtual value function associated with the distribution F , i.e.ψF (x) = x − 1−F (x )f (x ) .
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Fig. 4. Left: Average utility of bidders at Bayes-Nash equilibrium depending on the class of shad-
ing function and the number of players. Right: Strategy profile corresponding to the respective
shading functions with two bidders. All bidders have as value distribution a uniform distribution on [0,1].
The payoff are computed with averaging the payoff over 100000 runs of the auction system. The reserve price
corresponding to the thresholded strategy correspond to the minimum bid of the bidders which is equal to
0.18825. We notice that the thresholded equilibrium strategy gives the same profit as bidding truthfully when
the seller does not set any reserve prices - the two curves cannot be distinguished on our graph as our theory
predicts.
Lemma 8. Suppose that the buyer uses a strategy β under her value distribution F . Suppose the
seller thinks that the value distribution of the buyer is G. Call λF and λG the hazard rate functions of
the two distributions Then the seller computes the virtual value function of the buyer underG , denoted
ψB,G , as
ψB,G (β(x)) = ψB,F (β(x)) − β ′(x)
(
1
λG (x) −
1
λF (x)
)
.
As an aside, we note that by definition we have 1λG (x ) − 1λF (x ) = ψF (x) − ψG (x). We have the
following useful corollary pertaining to the thresholded strategies described in Section 3.
Corollary 1. If the buyer uses the strategy β˜ (ϵ )r (x) defined as
β˜ (ϵ )r (x) =
( (r − ϵ)(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x) + ϵ
)
1[x ≤r ] + x1[x>r ] ,
we have, for x , r ,ψB,F (β˜ (ϵ )r (x)) = ϵ1[x ≤r ] +ψF (x)1[x>r ] . In particular, we have for x , rψB,F (β˜ (ϵ )r (x)) −ψB,G (β˜ (ϵ )r (x)) ≤ |ψF (x) −ψG (x)| [(r − ϵ)1[x ≤r ] + 1[x>r ]] .
If for all x ,ψB,F (β˜ (ϵ )r ) ≥ ϵ and |ψF (x) −ψG (x)| ≤ δ , we haveψB,G (β˜ (ϵ )r (x)) ≥ ϵ − δ max((r − ϵ), 1) .
Hence, a natural way to quantify the proximity of distributions in this context is of course in
terms of their virtual value functions. Furthermore, if the buyer uses a shading function such that,
under her strategy and with her value distribution, the perceived virtual value is positive, as long
as the seller computes the virtual value using a nearby distribution, she will also perceive a positive
virtual value and hence have no incentive to put a reserve price above the lowest bid. In particular,
if δ comes from an approximation error that the buyer can predict or measure, she can also adjust
her ϵ so as to make sure that the seller perceives a positive virtual value for all x . We pursue this
specific question in more details in the next subsection.
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5.1.1 The case of empirical risk minimization (ERM). The previous results already give some results
about the impact of empirically estimating the value distribution F by the empirical cumulative
distribution function Fˆn on setting the reserve price. However because our approximations are
formulated in terms of hazard rate, applying those results would yield quite poor approximation
results in the context of setting the monopoly price through ERM. This is due to the fact that
estimating a density pointwise in supremum norm is a somewhat difficult problem in general,
associated with poor rates of convergence. We refer the interested reader to [34] for more details
on this question.
So we now focus on the specific problem of empirical minimization and take advantage of its
characteristics to obtain better results than would have been possible by applying the results of the
previous section naively.
Theorem 4. Suppose the buyer has a continuous and increasing value distribution F , supported
on [0,b], b ≤ ∞, with the property that if r ≥ x2 ≥ x1, F (x2) − F (x1) ≥ γF (x2 − x1), where γF > 0.
Suppose finally that supt ≥r t(1 − F (t)) = r (1 − F (r )).
Suppose the buyer uses the strategy β˜ (ϵ )r described above and samples n values {xi }ni=1 i.i.d according
to the distribution F and bids accordingly in second price auctions. Call x(n) = max1≤i≤n xi . In this
case the (population) reserve value x∗ is equal to 0.
Assume that the seller uses empirical risk minimization to determine the monopoly price in a (lazy)
second price auction, using these n samples. Call xˆ∗n the reserve value determined by the seller using
ERM.
We have, if Cn(δ ) = n−1/2
√
log(2/δ )/2 and ϵ > x(n)Cn(δ )/F (r ) with probability at least 1 − δ1,
xˆ∗n <
2rCn(δ )
ϵγF
with probability at least 1 − (δ + δ1) .
In particular, if ϵ is replaced by a sequence ϵn such that
n1/2ϵnmin(1, 1/x(n)) → ∞ in probability, xˆ∗n goes to 0 in probability like n−1/2 max(1,x(n))/ϵn .
Informally speaking, our theorem says that using the strategy β˜ (ϵn )r with ϵn slightly larger than
n−1/2 will yield a reserve value arbitrarily close to 0. Hence the population results we derived in
earlier sections apply to the sample version of the problem. We give examples and discuss our
assumptions in Appendix G.2 where we prove the theorem.
5.2 Robustness to mechanism change, applicability to more auctions
We now prove that the thresholded strategies are robust to certain changes of mechanism. We
consider the Myerson auction and the eager second price auction with monopoly prices. We show
that in the symmetric setting thresholding yields a greater utility gain in these more optimized
mechanisms than it does in a lazy second price auction.
Myerson auction. In the one-strategic setting, in the symmetric case where all bidders have
initially the same value distribution, we show that the utility gain for the strategic bidder of
thresholding at the monopoly price is higher in the Myerson auction than in the lazy second price
auction. Since in the symmetric case the bidders have the same utility when bidding truthfully in
the Myerson and the lazy second price auction, our result shows in this setup that the utility of the
strategic bidder is higher in the Myerson auction than in the lazy second price auction.
Lemma 9. Consider the case where the distribution of the competition is fixed. Assume all bidders
have the same value distribution FX , and that FX is regular. Assume that bidder i is strategic and that
the K − 1 other bidders bid truthfully. Let us denote by βtruth the truthful strategy and βthresh the
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thresholded strategy at the monopoly price with ϵ = 0. The utility of bidder i in the Myerson auction
U
Myerson
i and in the lazy second price auctionU
Lazy
i satisfy
U
Myerson
i (βthresh) −UMyersoni (βtruth) ≥ U Lazyi (βthresh) −U Lazyi (βtruth)
The proof is given in Appendix H.1. We report the corresponding uplift in the Myerson auction.
Numerics with K = 2 bidders withU[0, 1] value distribution. The utility is 1/12 in the truthful
case in both lazy second price and Myerson since these auctions are identical in the symmetric case.
The utility of the thresholded strategy at monopoly price is 7/48 in the Myerson auction, i.e. 75%
more than the utility with the truthful strategy. We note that the gain is larger than for a second
price auction with monopoly reserve where the extra utility was 57%.
Eager second price auction with monopoly price. We can prove a similar result for eager second
price auctions with monopoly prices as reserve prices. Monopoly reserves are not optimal reserve
prices for this version of the second price auction in general but in practice, the optimal ones
are NP-hard to compute and an eager second price auction with monopoly reserves brings more
revenue for the seller than a lazy second price auction with monopoly reserves when bidders are
asymmetric (see [30] for more details). We recall that the eager second price auction is a standard
second price auction between bidders who clear their reserves.
Lemma 10. Consider the case where the distribution of the competition is fixed. Assume all bidders
have the same value distribution, FX and that FX is regular. Assume that bidder i is strategic and that
the K − 1 other bidders bid truthfully. Let us denote by βtruth the truthful strategy and βthresh the
thresholded strategy at the monopoly price with ϵ = 0. The utility of bidder i in the eager second price
auction with monopoly reserves, U Eaдeri , and in the lazy second price auction U
Lazy
i with the same
reserves, satisfy
U
Eager
i (βthresh) −U Eageri (βtruth) ≥ U Lazyi (βthresh) −U Lazyi (βtruth)
The proof is given in Appendix H.2. These two lemmas show that thresholded strategies can
increase the utility of strategic bidders even if the seller runs a different auction than the lazy
second price auction with monopoly price which was the main focus of our work. In future work,
we plan to design games between bidders and seller where the seller can change the mechanism at
any point and bidders can update their bidding strategy changing the bid distribution observed
by the seller. One consequence of our work is that strategic bidders can use it to compute a lower
bound on the price for sharing their value distribution with the seller, at least in the symmetric
setting: the difference between their utilities when they bid truthfully and by using thresholding. It
would be interesting to use this result to understand how a contract between bidders and seller
should look like when the value distribution of the bidder is not known to the seller. We also plan
to consider in future work the problem of the strategic reaction of the seller to the type of bidding
strategies we have proposed in this paper.
6 CONCLUSION
Reserve prices are learned in many practical situations by using past bids. In this case, the celebrated
second price auction is not anymore truthful. We propose an easy-to-implement strategy which
keeps unchanged the expected payment of the strategic bidder, and increases very substantially
her utility, even when the bidder has no information about the competition. This is possible as
the strategic bidder overbids below the monopoly price, which can be interpreted as a form of
payment to the seller in exchange for a lower reserve price. When all the bidders become strategic,
we show that they can recover all the utility lost due to the introduction of reserve prices at a
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Nash equilibrium in the class of strategies we propose. This body of work suggests that, perhaps
counter-intuitively, adopting revenue-optimizing auctions may not always bring more revenue to
the seller facing strategic bidders. It does however turn otherwise simple means of exchange of
goods into quite opaque ones and may destroy welfare.
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A A VISUALIZATION OF THE MYERSON LEMMA
Figure 5 shows how the payment of the bidder changes as a function of the reserve price. This
payment is computed through the Myerson lemma. Our example considers the case of two bidders
with value distributionU([0, 1]). We denote byMi (βi , r ) the payment of bidder i as a function the
strategy βi and the reserve price r . The plot depicts the result of the Myerson lemma, i.e.
Mi (βi , r ) = EBi∼FBi
(
ψBi (Bi )Gi (Bi )1(Bi ≥ r )
)
.
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Fig. 5. Payment of the bidder as a function of the reserve price r, truthful and thresholded strategies.
We consider the standard textbook example of two bidders withU([0, 1]) value distribution. We see that
the thresholded strategy (ϵ = 0 in this example) and the truthful strategy have the same optimum payment
from the seller standpoint but they correspond to two different reserve prices: 0.5 for the truthful strategy
and 0.25 for the thresholded strategy. For the thresholded strategy we plot the payment starting at the
minimum bid (and hence minimum reserve price), which is why this curve starts at r = .25. The payment for
the thresholded strategy is a non-increasing function of the reserve price, which implies that the welfare
benevolent seller will pick as reserve price the lowest bid of the strategic bidder’s bid distribution.
B IMPACT ON BIDDER’S UTILITY
Figure 6 below depicts the average utility that can be unlocked with lower reserve prices, explaining
why there is an incentive for the strategic bidder to threshold their virtual value.
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Fig. 6. Extra utility of the strategic bidder when she is using the thresholded strategy. The competi-
tion is one bidder bidding truthfully with value distribution equal toU([0, 1]). The total expected utility of
the strategic bidder is equal to the full area under the curve. For the truthful strategy, the reserve value is
equal to the reserve price (0.5). The reserve value of the thresholded strategy is equal to 0.
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C THRESHOLDED STRATEGY IN THE CASE OF LOG NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
Figure 7 shows the impact of thresholding at the monopoly price on a log-normal bid distribution,
showing the new density of bids, virtual value and bidding strategy.
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Fig. 7. Thresholding the virtual value with log-normal distribution with parameters µ = 0.25 and σ = 1. fX
above represents the strategic bidder’s density for his value distribution. fB corresponds to the density of her
bid. We use similar notations to denote and depict the associated virtual values, as functions of the values.
D PROOF OF RESULTS OF SECTION 2
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 (Integrated version of the Myerson lemma). Let bidder i have value distribution Fi
and call βi her strategy, FBi the induced distribution of bids andψBi the corresponding virtual value
function. Assume that FBi has a density and finite mean. Suppose that i’s bids are independent of the
bids of the other bidders and denote byGi the cdf of the maximum of their bids. Suppose a lazy second
price auction with reserve price denoted by r is run. Then the paymentMi of bidder i to the seller can
be expressed as
M(βi ) = EBi∼FBi
(
ψBi (Bi )Gi (Bi )1(Bi ≥ r )
)
.
When the other bidders are bidding truthfully,Gi is the distribution of the maximum value of the other
bidders.
Proof. The proof is similar to the original one [28] (see [20] for more details). It consists in using
Fubini’s theorem and integration by parts (this is why we need conditions on FBi ) to transform the
standard form of the seller revenue, i.e.
EBi∼FBi ,Bj∼FBj
(
max
j,i
(Bj , r )1[Bi ≥maxj,i (Bj ,r )]
)
into the above equation. We consider a lazy second price auction. Call r the reserve price for bidder
i . So the seller revenue from bidder i is
E
(
max
j,i
(Bj , r )1[Bi ≥maxj,i (Bj ,r )]
)
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In general, we could just call Yi = maxj,i Bj and say that the revenue from i , or i’th expected
payment is
E
(
max(Yi , r )1[Bi ≥max(Yi ,r )]
)
.
Call G the cdf of Yi and G˜ the cdf of max(Yi , r ). Note that G˜(t) = 1[t ≥r ]G(t).
So if we note Bi = t , we have
E
(
max(Yi , r )1[Bi ≥max(Yi ,r )] |Bi = t
)
=
∫ t
0
udG˜(u)
Integrating by parts we get∫ t
0
udG˜(u) = uG˜(u)t0 − ∫ t0 G˜(u)du
= tG˜(t) −
∫ t
0
G˜(u)du = 1[t ≥r ]
[
tG(t) −
∫ t
r
G(u)du
]
Hence,
E
(
max(Yi , r )1[bi ≥max(Yi ,r )]
)
=
∫ ∞
0
[
1[bi ≥r ]biG(bi ) −
∫ bi
0
1[u≥r ]G(u)du
]
fBi (bi )dbi
The first term of this integral is simply∫ ∞
0
1[bi ≥r ]biG(bi )fBi (bi )dbi = E
(
BiG(Bi )1[Bi ≥r ]
)
.
Note that to split the two terms of the integral we need to assume that E (Bi ) < ∞, hence the first
moment assumption on Fi . The other part of the integral is∫ ∞
0
(∫ bi
0
1[u≥r ]G(u)du
)
fBi (bi )dbi =
∫ ∞
0
(∫
1[bi ≥u]1[u≥r ]G(u)du
)
fBi (bi )dbi (6)
=
∫ ∫
1[u≥r ]G(u)1[bi ≥u] fBi (bi )dbidu =
∫
1[u≥r ]G(u)
(∫
1[bi ≥u] f (bi )dbi
)
du (7)
=
∫
1[u≥r ]G(u)P(Bi ≥ u)du =
∫
1[u≥r ]G(u)
1 − FBi (u)
fBi (u)
fBi (u)du (8)
= E
(
1[Bi ≥r ]G(Bi )
1 − FBi (Bi )
fBi (Bi )
)
(9)
We used Fubini’s theorem to change order of integrations, since all functions are non-negative. The
result follows.
Of course, when fBi (bi ) = 0 somewhere we understand fBi (bi )/fBi (bi ) = 0/0 as being equal to 1.
To avoid this problem completely we can also simply write
M(βi ) =
∫ [
bi fBi (bi ) − (1 − FBi (bi ))
]
G(bi )1[bi ≥r ]dbi =
∫
∂[bi (FBi (bi ) − 1)]
∂bi
G(bi )1[bi ≥x ]dbi .
If FBi is not differentiable but absolutely continuous, its Radon-Nikodym derivative is used when
interpreting the differentiation of [bi (FBi (bi ) − 1)] with respect to bi .
□
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D.2 Proof of Theorem 1
This theorem works for non-regular value distributions and in the asymmetric case when the
bidders have different value distributions.
Theorem 1. Consider the one-strategic setting in a lazy second price auction with FXi the value
distribution of the strategic bidder i and a seller computing the reserve prices to maximize her revenue.
No assumptions are needed on the distributions of other bidders. Suppose βr is a shading function with
associated reserve value r > 0. Then we can find β˜r such that: 1) The reserve value associated with β˜r
is 0. 2)U (β˜r ) ≥ U (βr ),U being the utility of the buyer. 3) Ri (β˜r ) ≥ Ri (βr ), Ri being the payment of
bidder i to the seller. The following continuous functions fulfill these conditions for ϵ small enough:
β˜ (ϵ )r (x) =
( [βr (r ) − ϵ](1 − FXi (r ))
1 − FXi (x)
+ ϵ
)
1x<r + βr (x)1x ≥r
Proof. The reserve value r > 0 is given. Consider
β˜r (x) =
{
tr (x) if x ≤ r
βr (x) if x > r
To make things simple we require tr (r ) = βr (r+), so we have continuity. Note that beyond r the
seller revenue is unaffected. If the seller sets the reserve value at r0 the extra benefit compared to
setting it at r is
E
(
ψtr (tr (X )G(tr (X ))1[r0≤X<r ]
)
.
Hence, as long asψtr (x) ≥ 0, the seller has an incentive to lower the reserve value. The extra gain
to the buyer is
E
((X −ψtr (tr (X )))G(tr (X ))1[r0≤X<r ]) .
Now, if we take
tr (x) = tr (0)1 − F (x) ,
it is easy to verify that
ψtr (tr (x)) = tr (x) − t ′r (x)
1 − F (x)
f (x) = 0 .
So in this limit case, there is no change in buyer’s payment and when the reserve price is moved by
the seller to any value on [0, r ]. If we assume that the seller is welfare benevolent, she will set the
reserve value to 0. To have continuity of the bid function, we just require that
tr (0)
1 − F (r ) = βr (r
+) .
Since there is no extra cost for the buyer, it is clear that his/her payoff is increased with this strategy.
Taking t (ϵ )r such that
ψt (ϵ )r
(t (ϵ )r (x)) = ϵ ,
gives a strict incentive to the seller to move the reserve value to 0, (so the assumption that s/he
is welfare benevolent is not required) even if it is slightly suboptimal for the buyer. Note that we
explained in Lemma 3 how to construct such aψ . In particular,
tϵr =
Cϵ
1 − F (x) + ϵ, with
Cϵ
1 − F (r ) + ϵ = βr (r
+)
works. Taking limits proves the result, i.e. for ϵ small enough the Lemma holds, since everything is
continuous in ϵ . □
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Comment We note that the flexibility afforded by ϵ is two-fold: when ϵ > 0, the extra seller
revenue is a strictly decreasing function of the reserve price; hence even if for some reason reserve
price movements are required to be small, the seller will have an incentive to make such move. The
other reason is more related to estimation issues: if the reserve price is determined by empirical risk
minimization, and hence affected by even small sampling noise, having ϵ big enough will guarantee
that the mean extra gain of the seller will be above this sampling noise. Of course, the average
cost for the bidder can be interpreted to just be ϵ at each value under the current reserve price and
hence may not be a too hefty price to bear.
E PROOF OF RESULTS OF SECTION 3
E.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. Suppose we change β into βt = β + tρ. Both β and βt are assumed to be non-decreasing.
Call xβ the reserve value corresponding to β , assume it has the property thathβ (xβ ) = 0 andh′β (xβ ) , 0
(h′β is assumed to exist locally). Assume xβ is the unique global maximizer of the revenue of the seller.
Then,
∂
∂t
U (βt )

t=0
=E
(
д(β(x))[x − β(x)]ρ(x)1[x ≥xβ ]
)
+G(β(xβ ))
[
xβ f (xβ )/h′β (xβ ) − (1 − F (xβ ))
]
ρ(xβ )
− ρ ′(xβ )xβ (1 − F (xβ ))G(β(xβ ))/h′β (xβ ) .
Proof. It is easy to see that hβ+tρ = hβ + thρ and hence
∂
∂t
hβt = hρ ,
∂
∂t
βt = ρ , and
∂
∂t
xβt = −
hρ (xβ )
h′β (xβ )
.
We call xβ the reserve value, which we assume satisfies hβ (xβ ) = 0. Hence,
∂
∂t
U (βt )

t=0
= E
(
[д(β(X ))ρ(X )(X − hβ (X ))
−hρ (X )G(β(X ))]1[X ≥xβ ]
)
+ xβG(β(xβ ))f (xβ )hρ (xβ )/h′β (xβ ) .
Recall that hρ (x) = ρ(x) − ρ ′(x)(1 − F (x))/f (x). Hence, rewriting the expectation as an integral,
we get
E
(
ρ ′(X )G(β(X ))1 − F (X )
f (X ) 1[X ≥xβ ]
)
=
∫ ∞
h−1β (0)
ρ ′(x)(1 − F (x))G(β(x))dx
= ρ(x)(1 − F (x))G(β(x))|∞xβ
−
∫ ∞
xβ
ρ(x)(−f (x)G(β(x)) + β ′(x)д(β(x))(1 − F (x)))dx
Of course this integral can be written as
E
(
ρ(X )1[X ≥xβ ]
[
G(β(X )) − β ′(X )д(β(X ))1 − F (X )
f (X )
] )
.
Rearranging everything we finally find the announced result. □
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E.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. Suppose that only one bidder is strategic, let G denote the CDF of the maximum value of
the competition and g the corresponding pdf. Denote byU (βγr ) the utility of the bidder using the strategy
β
γ
r according to the parametrization of Definition 2. Assume that the seller is welfare-benevolent. Then
if βt = β
γ+tρ
r ,
∂U (βt )
∂t

t=0
= E
(
(X − γ (X ))д(γ (X ))ρ(X )1[X ≥r ]
)
+ ρ(r )
(1 − F (r ))
(
E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
−G(γ (r ))
)
∂U (βγr )
∂r
= − hβ (r )f (r )(
E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
−G(γ (r ))
)
The only strategy γ and threshold r for which we can cancel the derivatives in all directions ρ consists
in bidding truthfully beyond r ∗, where r ∗ satisfies the equation
G(r ∗) = E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
r ∗(1 − F (r ∗))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ∗]
)
.
Proof. Recall that our revenue in such a strategy (we take ϵ = 0) is just, when the seller is
welfare-benevolent (and hence s/he will push the reserve value to 0 as long asψB (β(x)) ≥ 0 for all
x )
U (βγr ) = E
((X −ψB (β(X )))G(β(X ))1[X ≥r ]) + E (XG(β(r )(1 − F (r ))1 − F (x) )1[X ≤r ]) .
Now if βt = β + tρ, as usual, we haveψBt (βt ) = hβ + thρ . Because we assumed thatψB (β(r )) > 0,
changing β to βt won’t drastically change that; in particular ifψBt (βt (r )) > 0 the seller is still going
to take all bids after βt (r ). In particular, we don’t have to deal with the fact that the optimal reserve
value for the seller may be completely different for β and βt . So the assumption ψB (β(r )) > 0 is
here for convenience and to avoid technical nuisances. In any case, we have
∂U (βt )
∂t
= E
( [−hρ (X )G(β(X )) + (X − hβ (X ))ρ(X )д(γ (X ))] 1[X ≥r ])
+E
(
Xρ(r ) 1 − F (r )1 − F (X )д(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x) )1[X ≤r ]
)
.
Now using integration by parts on
∫ ∞
r ρ
′(x)(1 − F (x))G(γ (x))dx , we have
E
(−hρ (X )G(β(X ))1[X ≥r ]) = ρ(x)(1 − F (x))G(γ (x))|∞r
+
∫ ∞
r
[ρ(x)f (x)G(γ (x)) − ρ(x)β ′(x)д(γ (x))(1 − F (x))]dx
−
∫ ∞
r
ρ(x)f (x)G(γ (x))dx
= −ρ(r )(1 − F (r ))G(β(r )) − E
(
ρ(X )β ′(X )д(γ (X ))1 − F (X )
f (X )
)
.
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Hence,
∂U (βt )
∂t
= E
((X − γ (X ))ρ(X )д(γ (X ))1[X ≥r ]) − ρ(r )(1 − F (r ))G(γ (r ))
+ρ(r )(1 − F (r ))E
((
X
1 − F (X )
)
д(γ (r )(1 − F (r ))1 − F (x) )1[X ≤r ]
)
.
This gives the first equation of Lemma 6.
On the other hand, we have
∂U (βγr )
∂r
= −(r −ψB (γ (r )))G(γ (r ))f (r ) + rG(γ (r ))f (r )
+E
(
X
1 − F (X )д(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x) )1[X ≤r ]
)
[γ ′(r )(1 − F (r )) − β(r )f (r )] .
Since
[γ ′(r )(1 − F (r )) − γ (r )f (r )] = −f (r )ψB (β(r )) ,
we have established that
∂U (βγr )
∂r
= ψB (γ (r ))f (r )
[
G(γ (r )) − E
(
X
1 − F (X )д(
γ (r )(1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x) )1[X ≤r ]
)]
.
We see that the only strategy β and threshold r for which we can cancel the derivatives in all
directions ρ consists in bidding truthfully beyond r , where r satisfies the equation
G(r ) = E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
.
Lemma 5 is shown. □
F PROOF OF RESULTS OF SECTION 4
F.1 Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. Suppose X has a distribution for whichψX crosses 0 exactly once and is positive beyond
that crossing point. Then Equation (5) has a unique non-zero solution.
Proof. We have by integration by parts
(K − 1)E
((
XFK−2(X )(1 − F (X ))1[X ≤r ]
))
= r (1 − F (r ))FK−1(r ) + E
((
ψX (X )FK−1(X )1[X ≤r ]
))
.
Hence finding the root of
K − 1
r (1 − F (r ))E
((
XFK−2(X )(1 − F (X ))1[X ≤r ]
))
= FK−1(r )
amounts to finding the root(s) of
R(r ) ≜ E
((
ψX (X )FK−1(X )1[X ≤r ]
))
= 0 .
0 is an obvious root of the above equation but does not work for the penultimate one. Note that for
the class of distributions we consider (which is much larger than regular distributions but contains
it), this function R is decreasing and then increasing afterψ−1X (0), since the virtual value is negative
and then positive. Since R(0) = 0, it will have at most one non-zero root for the distributions
we consider. The fact that this function is positive at infinity (or at the end of the support of X )
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comes from the fact that its value then is the revenue-per-buyer of a seller performing a second
price auction with K symmetric buyers bidding truthfully with a reserve price of 0. And this is by
definition positive. So we have shown that for regular distributions and the much broader class of
distributions we consider the function R has exactly one non-zero root. □
F.2 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 3. We consider the symmetric setting where all the bidders have the same value distribu-
tions. We assume for simplicity that the distribution is supported on [0,1]. Suppose this distribution has
density that is continuous at 0 and 1 with f (1) , 0 and follows the assumptions of Lemma 7.
There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the class of thresholded bidding strategies defined
in Definition 2. It is found by solving Equation (5) to determine r ∗ and bidding truthfully beyond r ∗
Moreover, if all the bidders are playing this strategy corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium,
the revenue of the seller is the same as in a second price auction with no reserve price. The same is true
of the utility of the buyers.
Sketch of proof:
• State a directional derivative result in this class of strategies by directionally-differentiating
the expression ofUi (β , ..., βt , ..., β).
• Prove uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
• Prove existence of the Nash equilibrium.
• Show equivalence of revenue with a second price auction without reserve.
• On Equation (5) and consequences
Recall the statement of Equation (5).
E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
= G(r ) . (5)
Lemma 11. Suppose X has a regular distribution that is compactly supported (on [0,1] for conve-
nience). Equation (5) can be re-written as
E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
= G(r ) + 1
r (1 − F (r ))E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
. (10)
Equation (5) has at most one solution on (0,1). This possible root is greater than ψ−1(0). 0 is also a
(trivial) solution of Equation (5).
The assumption that X is supported on [0,1] can easily be replaced by the assumption that it is
compactly supported, but it made notations more convenient.
Proof of Lemma 11. We use again integration by parts :
E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
=
∫ r
0
x(1 − F (x))
(1 − F (x))2 д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x)
)
f (x)dx
= x(1 − F (x))
G
(
r (1−F (r ))
1−F (x )
)
r (1 − F (r ))

r
0
− 1
r (1 − F (r ))
∫ r
0
(x(1 − F (x)))′G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x)
)
dx
= G(r ) + 1
r (1 − F (r ))E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
.
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So we are really looking at the properties of the solution of
1
r (1 − F (r ))E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
= 0 .
We call
I (r ) = E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
.
For regular distributions, it is clear that if r = ψ−1(0), I (r ) < 0.
Now we note that
∂I (r )
∂r
= ψX (r )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (r )
)
−ψX (r )E
(
ψX (X )
1 − F (X )д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
.
UsingψX (x) = x − (1 − F (x))/f (x) < x , we see that
E
(
ψX (X )
1 − F (X )д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
< E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
So if r is a solution of
E
(
X
1 − F (X )д
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
= G(r )
we have, if r > ψ−1X (0) and r , 1,
∂I (r )
∂r
> 0 .
So r needs to be a solution of I (r ) = 0 (which is equivalent to the initial equation for non-trivial
solutions) and must have ∂I (r )∂r > 0.
So we have shown that I is a function such that its (non-trivial) zeros are such that I is strictly
increasing at those roots. Because I is differentiable and hence continuous, this implies that I can
have at most one non-trivial root. (0 is a trivial root of I (r ) = 0, though it is not an acceptable
solution of our initial problem.)
We note that the end point of the support of X is also a trivial solution of I (r ) = 0, by the
dominated convergence theorem, though not an acceptable solution of our initial problem, as
shown by a simple inspection.
□
Lemma 12. Suppose that G(0) = 0, G is continuous and either G(x) = дk (0)xk + o(xk ) near 0 for
some k or G is constant near 0. Assume f has a continuous density near 1 with f (1) , 0 and the
Assumptions of Lemma 11 are satisfied. Then Equation
G(r ) = 1
r (1 − F (r ))E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x)
)
1[X ≤r ]
)
= 0
has a unique root in (0, 1).
In particular in this situation there exists an optimal strategy in the class of shading functions
defined in Definition 2 and it is unique. It is defined by being truthful beyond r ∗ : G(r ∗) = 0 and
shading in such a way that our virtual value is 0 below r ∗.
Proof. We have already seen that this equation has at most one zero on (0,1) so we now just
need to show that the functionG is positive somewhere to have established that it has a zero. Of
course, for r = ψ−1(0), the function is negative.
• G not locally constant near 0 SinceG is a cdf, and hence a non-decreasing function, the first
k such that д(k )(0) , 0 has д(k )(0) > 0. Otherwise, G would be decreasing around 0. We treat the
case where G is constant near 0 later so we now assume that k exists and is finite.
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Let r be such that 1−F (r ) = ϵ very small (e.g. 10−6). Let c < r be such that (1−F (r ))/(1−F (c)) < η
very small (e.g. 10−3) andψX (c) > 0. Hence we can use a Taylor approximation to get that
G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x)
)
1[x ≤c] ≃ д(k )(0) (r (1 − F (r )))
k
(1 − F (x))k 1[x ≤c] .
Integrating this out (ignoring at this point possible integration questions), we get
E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x)
)
1[X ≤c]
)
≃ д(k )(0)(r (1 − F (r )))kE
(
ψX (X )
[1 − F (X )]k 1[X ≤c]
)
.
Now integration by parts shows that, if k > 1
E
(
ψX (X )
[1 − F (X )]k 1[X ≤c]
)
=
∫ c
0
x
f (x)
(1 − F (x))k −
1
(1 − F (x))k−1dx
=
x f (x)
(1 − F (x))k
c
0
−
(
1 + 1
k − 1
) ∫ c
0
dx
[1 − F (x)]k−1 .
If k = 1, using the fact that (ln(1 − F (x))′ = −f (x)/(1 − F (x)), we have
E
(
ψX (X )
1 − F (X )1[X ≤c]
)
=
∫ c
0
x
f (x)
1 − F (x) − 1dx
= −x ln(1 − F (x))|c0 − c +
∫ c
0
ln(1 − F (x))dx = −c ln(1 − F (c)) − c +
∫ c
0
ln(1 − F (x))dx
We now assume that k > 1; the adjustments for k = 1 are trivial and are left to the reader. Clearly,
when F (c) is close to 1, we have, since we assume that f (c) , 0,∫ c
0
dx
[1 − F (x)]k−1 ≤
c
(1 − F (c))k−1 = o
(
c f (c)/(1 − F (x))k
)
.
So we have, as c increases so that F (c) ≃ 1 (while of course having (1 − F (r ))/(1 − F (c)) < η),
1
r (1 − F (r ))E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x)
)
1[X ≤c]
)
∼ [r (1 − F (r ))]k−1 д(k )(0) c f (c)(1 − F (c))k > 0 .
So we have, ifψX (x)f (x) is continuous near r , i.e. f (x) is continuous near r ,
E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[c≤X ≤r ]
)
≥ G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (c)
)
E
(
ψX (X )1[c≤X ≤r ]
)
≃ G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (c)
)
(r − c)(r f (r ) − (1 − F (r )) ≃ G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (c)
)
(r − c)r f (r ) .
Now we note that using a Taylor expansion of 1 − F (x) around r , we have
x ≃ r + F (x) − F (r )
f (r ) .
So we see that
1
r (1 − F (r ))E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[c≤X ≤r ]
)
≃ rG
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (c)
)
F (r ) − F (c)
1 − F (r ) ≃ rG
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (c)
) (
1 − F (c)
1 − F (r ) − 1
)
.
If now we take c2 such that 1 − F (r )/(1 − F (c2)) = 1/3, the reasoning above applies and we have
1
r (1 − F (r ))E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[c2≤X ≤r ]
)
≥ rG (r/3) > 0 .
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Because π (r ) = (1 − F (r ))/(1 − F (x)) is increasing, we have c ≤ c2, since η = π (c) ≤ π (c2) = 1/3 .
So we have
1
r (1 − F (r ))E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (X )
)
1[c≤X ≤c2]
)
≥ 0 .
Of course the choice of 1/3 above is arbitrary and it could be replaced by any fixed number s < 1
such that G(sr ) > 0. We conclude thatG is positive in a neighborhood of 1.
• G locally constant near 0 In this case we can pick c such that
E
(
ψX (X )G
(
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x)
)
1[X ≤c]
)
= 0 .
If c is such thatψ (c) > 0 our arguments above immediately carry through. In fact we can ensure
that this is always true by picking such a c and picking a corresponding r as function of the ratio
(1 − F (r ))/(1 − F (c)) we would like.
So we conclude that even in this case,G is positive in a neighborhood of 1 □
Theorem 5. We consider the symmetric case and assume that bidders have a compactly supported
and regular distribution. We assume for simplicity that the distribution is supported on [0,1].
Suppose this distribution has density that is continuous at 0 and 1 with f (1) , 0.
Then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the class of shading functions defined in Definition
2.
It is found by solving Equation (5) to determine r ∗ and bidding truthfully beyond r ∗.
Proof. We already know that there is at most one solution since Equation (5) has exactly one
solution.
If all the bidders but one put themselves at this strategy, we know from Lemma 12, which applies
because of our assumptions on f , that the optimal strategy for bidder one is unique in the class we
consider and consists in using a shading that is truthful beyond r . This r is uniquely determined by
Equation (5) but given the shading used by the other players we know that the r determined by
Equation (5) is a solution. Hence we have an equilibrium. □
Uniform[0,1] exampleWhen K = 2, the solution of Equation (5) and hence the equilibrium is
obtained at r = 3/4. For K = 3, r = 2/3; K = 4 gives r = 15/24 = 0.625; K = 5 gives r = .6.
With appropriate shading functions, the bidders can recover the utility they would get when the
seller was not optimizing her mechanism to maximize her revenue. Nevertheless, this equilibrium
can be weakly collusive since we restrict ourselves to the class of functions introduced in Definition
2. It is not obvious that the strategy exhibited in Theorem 6 is an equilibrium in a larger class of
functions. However, as mentioned previously, from a practical standpoint, as of now there exists no
other clear way to increase drastically bidders utility that is independent from a precise estimation
of the competition. The fact that at symmetric equilibrium bidders recover the same utility as in
a second price auction with no reserves arguably makes it an even more natural class of bidding
strategies to consider from the bidder standpoint.
F.3 Equivalence of revenue
Theorem 6. Suppose we are in a symmetric situation and all buyers use the symmetric optimal
strategy described above.
Then the revenue of the seller is the same as in a second price auction with no reserve price. The
same is true of the revenue of the buyers.
Interestingly, the theorem shows that this shading strategy completely cancels the effect of the
reserve price. This is a result akin to our result on the Myerson auction.
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Proof. The revenue of the seller per buyer is
E
(
ψX (X )FK−1(X )1[X ≥r ∗]
)
, with R(r ∗) = 0 .
Hence it is also
E
(
ψX (X )FK−1(X )1[X ≥r ∗]
)
+ R(r ∗) = E
(
ψX (X )FK−1(X )
)
.
This is exactly the revenue of the seller in a second price auction with no reserve price.
From the buyer standoint, his/her revenue is, since all buyers are using the same increasing
strategy and the reserve value has been sent to 0,
E
(
(X −ψB (β(X ; r ∗)))FK−1(X )
)
= E
(
XFK−1(X )1[X ≤r ∗]
)
+ E
(
(X −ψX (X ))FK−1(X )1[X>r ∗]
)
.
We know however that R(r ∗) = 0 and therefore
E
(
XFK−1(X )1[X ≤r ∗]
)
= E
(
(X −ψX (X ))FK−1(X )1[X ≤r ∗]
)
.
Summing things up we get that his/her payoff
E
(
(X −ψX (X ))FK−1(X )
)
as in a second price auction with no reserve. □
G PROOF OF RESULTS IN SECTION 5
G.1 Proof of Lemma 8 and Corollary 1
Lemma 8. Suppose that the buyer uses a strategy β under her value distribution F . Suppose the
seller thinks that the value distribution of the buyer is G. Call λF and λG the hazard rate functions of
the two distributions Then the seller computes the virtual value function of the buyer underG , denoted
ψB,G , as
ψB,G (β(x)) = ψB,F (β(x)) − β ′(x)
(
1
λG (x) −
1
λF (x)
)
.
Proof. As we have seen before we have
ψB,F (β(x)) = β(x) − β ′(x)1 − F (x)
f (x) .
By construction, we have
β(x) − β ′(x)1 − F (x)
f (x) = 0 for x ≤ r .
If the seller perceives the behavior of the buyer under the distribution G, we have
ψB,G (β(x)) = β(x) − β ′(x)1 −G(x)
д(x) .
Hence, we have ψB,G (β(x)) −ψB,F (β(x)) = |β ′(x)| 1 − F (x)f (x) − 1 −G(x)д(x)  .
Recall the hazard function λF (x) = f (x)/(1 − F (x)). With this notation, we simply haveψB,G (β(x)) −ψB,F (β(x)) = |β ′(x)|  1λF (x) − 1λG (x)
 .
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The corollary follows by noting that when x ≤ r ,β ′r,ϵ (x)1 − F (x)f (x)  ≤ (r − ϵ) 1 − F (r )1 − F (x)
□
G.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. Suppose the buyer has a continuous and increasing value distribution F , supported
on [0,b], b ≤ ∞, with the property that if r ≥ x2 ≥ x1, F (x2) − F (x1) ≥ γF (x2 − x1), where γF > 0.
Suppose finally that supt ≥r t(1 − F (t)) = r (1 − F (r )).
Suppose the buyer uses the strategy β˜ (ϵ )r described above and samples n values {xi }ni=1 i.i.d according
to the distribution F and bids accordingly in second price auctions. Call x(n) = max1≤i≤n xi . In this
case the (population) reserve value x∗ is equal to 0.
Assume that the seller uses empirical risk minimization to determine the monopoly price in a (lazy)
second price auction, using these n samples.
Call xˆ∗n the reserve value determined by the seller using ERM.
We have, if Cn(δ ) = n−1/2
√
log(2/δ )/2 and ϵ > x(n)Cn(δ )/F (r ) with probability at least 1 − δ1,
xˆ∗n <
2rCn(δ )
ϵγF
with probability at least 1 − (δ + δ1) .
In particular, if ϵ is replaced by a sequence ϵn such that
n1/2ϵnmin(1, 1/x(n)) → ∞ in probability, xˆ∗n goes to 0 in probability like n−1/2 max(1,x(n))/ϵn .
Examples : Our theorem applies for value distributions that are bounded, with ϵn of order
n−1/2+η , η > 0 and fixed. If the value distribution is log-normal(µ,σ ) truncated away from 0 so all
values are greater than a very small threshold t , standard results on the maximum of i.i.d N(µ,σ )
random variables guarantee that x(n) ≤ exp(µ + σ
√
2 log(n)) with probability going to 1. In that
case too, picking ϵn of order n−1/2+η , η > 0 and fixed, guarantees that the reserve value computed
by the seller by ERM will converge to the population reserve value, which is of course 0.
Comment : The requirement on γF , which essentially means that the density f is bounded
away from 0 could also be weakened with more technical work to make this requirement hold only
around 0, at least for the convergence in probability result. Similarly one could handle situations,
like the log-normal case, where γF is close to 0 at 0 by refining slightly the first part of the argument
given in the proof. The formal proof is in Appendix G.
Proof. • Preliminaries
Notations :We use the standard notation for order statistics b(1) ≤ b(2) ≤ . . . ≤ b(n) to denote our n
increasingly ordered bids. We denote as usual by Fˆn the empirical cumulative distribution function
obtained from a sample of n i.i.d observations drawn from a population distribution F .
Setting the monopoly price by ERM amounts to finding, if Bˆn is the empirical cdf of the bids,
b∗n = argmax
t
t(1 − Bˆn(t))
We note in particular than
b∗n ≤ max1≤i≤n bi = b(n) ,
since (1 − Bˆn(t)) = 0 for t > b(n).
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Because (1 − Bˆn(t)) is piecewise constant and the function t 7→ t is increasing, on [b(i),b(i+1))
the function t(1 − Bˆn(t)) reaches its supremum at b−(i+1).
b∗n = argmax
t
t(1 − Bˆn(t)) = argmax
1≤i≤n−1
b−(i+1)
(
1 − i
n
)
.
Since our shading function βr,ϵ is increasing and if x(i) are our ordered values, we have, if Fˆn is the
empirical cdf of our value distribution,
argmax
1≤i≤n−1
b−(i+1)
(
1 − i
n
)
= argmax
1≤i≤n−1
βr,ϵ (u−(i+1))
(
1 − i
n
)
= argmax
u
βr,ϵ (u)(1 − Fˆn(u)) .
The last equality comes again from the fact that (1 − Fˆn(u)) is piecewise constant and βr,ϵ (u) is
increasing. So in our analysis we can act as if the seller had perfect information of our shading
function βr,ϵ .
In what follows we focus on reserve values and denote
xˆ∗r,n = argmax
0≤x ≤r
βr,ϵ (x)(1 − Fˆn(x)) , xˆ∗n = argmax
0≤x
βr,ϵ (x)(1 − Fˆn(x)) ,
x∗ = argmax βr,ϵ (x)(1 − F (x))
The arguments we gave above imply that xˆ∗r,n ≤ x(n). We will otherwise study the continuous
version of the problem. We also note that by construction, x∗ = 0, though we keep it in the proof
as it makes it clearer.
We recall one main result of [22] on the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality: if
Cn(δ ) = n−1/2
√
log(2/δ )/2,
P(sup
x
|Fˆn(x) − F (x)| > Cn(δ )) ≤ δ .
In what follows, we therefore assume that we have a uniform approximation
∀x , |Fˆn(x) − F (x)| ≤ Cn(δ ) ,
since it holds with probability 1 − δ . In what follows we write Cn instead of Cn(δ ) for the sake of
clarity. Using the fact that βr,ϵ is increasing, this immediately implies that with probability at least
1 − δ , for any c > 0
∀x ∈ [0, c] , |βr,ϵ (x)(1 − Fˆn(x)) − βr,ϵ (x)(1 − F (x))| ≤ βr,ϵ (c)Cn .
• xˆ∗r,n = argmaxy≤r βr,ϵ (y)(1 − Fˆn(y)) cannot be too far from x∗
Now for our construction of βr,ϵ (x), we have by construction that
∂
∂u
[β(u)(1 − F (u))] = −ϵ f (u) when x ≤ r .
In particular, it means that when x ,y ≤ r
βr,ϵ (x)(1 − F (x)) − βr,ϵ (y)(1 − F (y)) = −ϵ(F (x) − F (y)) .
Also x∗ = 0 since βr,ϵ (1 − F ) is decreasing on [0, r ], as we have just seen that its derivative is
negative. Here we used the fact that F is increasing.
If r > y ≥ x∗ + tCn/ϵ , we have, using the previous inequality and the fact that βr,ϵ (1 − F ) is
decreasing on [0, r ],
βr,ϵ (y)(1 − F (y)) ≤ βr,ϵ (x∗)(1 − F (x∗)) − ϵ(F (x∗ + tCn/ϵ) − F (x∗)) .
Since we assumed that F (x2) − F (x1) ≥ γF (x2 − x1), we have
−ϵ(F (x∗ + tCn/ϵ) − F (x∗)) ≤ −tCnγF .
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Since βr,ϵ is increasing, we have sup0≤x ≤r βr,ϵ (x) ≤ βr,ϵ (r ) = r . Picking t > 2r/γF , it is clear that
for r > y ≥ x + tCn/ϵ ,
max
r ≥u≥x+tCn/ϵ
βr,ϵ (u)(1 − Fˆn(u)) ≤ max
r ≥u≥x+tCn/ϵ
βr,ϵ (u)(1 − F (u)) + max
r ≥u≥x+tCn/ϵ
βr,ϵ (u)Cn
≤ βr,ϵ (x∗)(1 − F (x∗)) + (r − tγF )Cn < βr,ϵ (x∗)(1 − F (x∗)) − rCn ≤ βr,ϵ (x∗)(1 − Fˆn(x∗)) .
We conclude that xˆ∗r,n cannot be greater than x + 2rCn/(ϵγF ) and therefore
xˆ∗r,n − xˆ <
2rCn
ϵγF
.
• Dealing with maxy>r βr,ϵ (y)(1 − Fˆn(y))
Recall that maxx βr,ϵ (x)(1 − F (x)) = βr,ϵ (0)(1 − F (0)) = r (1 − F (r )) + ϵF (r ). We now assume that
maxy≥r y(1 − F (y)) = r (1 − F (r )). This is in particular the case for regular distributions, which are
commonly assumed in auction theory.
To show that the argmax cannot be in [r ,b] with pre-specified probability we simply show that
the estimated value of the seller revenue at reserve value 0 is higher thanmaxy>r βr,ϵ (y)(1− Fˆn(y)).
Of course,
max
y>r
βr,ϵ (y)(1 − Fˆn(y)) = max
x(n)≥y>r
βr,ϵ (y)(1 − Fˆn(y)) .
Recall that βr,ϵ (0) = r (1 − F (r )) + ϵF (r ). Under our assumptions, we have
βr,ϵ (0)(1 − Fˆn(0)) = βr,ϵ (0) = r (1 − F (r )) + ϵF (r ) and
max
x(n)≥y≥r
βr,ϵ (y)(1 − Fˆn(y))
≤ max
x(n)≥y≥r
βr,ϵ (y)(1 − F (y)) +Cn max
x(n)≥y≥r
βr,ϵ (y) ≤ r (1 − F (r )) +Cnx(n)
So as long as ϵ > x(n)Cn/F (r ), the result we seek holds. By assumption this property holds with
probability 1 − δ1.
The statement of the theorem holds when both parts of the proof hold. Since they hold with
probability at least 1 − δ and 1 − δ1 the intersection event holds with probability at least 1 − δ − δ1,
as announced. □
• Asymptotic statement/Convergence in probability issue
This is a straightforward application of the previous result and we give no further details.
H PROOF OF RESULTS OF SECTION 6
H.1 Thresholding at the monopoly price in the Myerson auction
Here we ask what happens when one player is strategic, the others are truthful and she thresholds
her virtual value at her monopoly price in the Myerson auction.
Lemma 9. Consider the one-strategic setting. Assume all bidders have the same value distribution,
FX and that FX is regular. Assume that bidder i is strategic that the K − 1 other bidders bid truthfully.
Let us denote by βtruth the truthful strategy and βthresh the thresholded strategy at the monopoly
price. The utility of the truthful bidder in the Myerson auctionUMyersoni and in the lazy second price
auctionU Lazyi satisfy
U
Myerson
i (βthresh) −UMyersoni (βtruth) ≥ U Lazyi (βthresh) −U Lazyi (βtruth)
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Proof. By definition the thresholded strategy at monopoly price βthresh verifies
ψBi (bi ) =
{
ψXi (xi ) if xi ≥ ψ−1Xi (0)
ϵ = 0+ if xi < ψ−1Xi (0) .
The revenue/utility of the buyer in the Myerson auction is
U
Myerson
i (β) = E
(
(Xi −ψBi (Bi ))1[ψBi (Bi )≥maxj,i (0,ψBj (Bj ))]
)
.
If we assume that all players except the i-th are truthful and the i-th player employs the strategy
described above, we get that
U
Myerson
i (βthresh) = E
(
(Xi −ψBi (Bi ))1[ψBi (Bi )≥maxj,i (0,ψBj (Bj ))]
)
= E
(
(Xi −ψXi (Xi ))1[ψXi (Xi )≥maxj,i (0,ψXj (X j ))]1[Xi ≥ψ −1Xi (0)]
)
+E
(
(Xi − ϵ)1[ϵ ≥maxj,i ψXj (X j )]1[Xi<ψ −1Xi (0)]
)
Note that here we’ve just split the integral into two according to whetherXi was greater of less than
the monopoly price and adjusted the definitions ofψBi (bi ) accordingly. We conclude immediately
that
U
Myerson
i (βthresh) = UMyersoni (βtruth) + E
(
(Xi − ϵ)1[ϵ ≥maxj,i ψXj (X j )]1[Xi<ψ −1Xi (0)]
)
.
Therefore the extra utility derived from our shading is just
U
Myerson
i (βthresh) −UMyersoni (βtruth) = E
(
(Xi − ϵ)1[ϵ ≥maxj,i ψXj (X j )]1[Xi<ψ −1Xi (0)]
)
If X j ’s are independent of Xi , we have
U
Myerson
i (βthresh)(ϵ) −UMyersoni (βtruth)(ϵ) = E
(
(Xi − ϵ)P(ϵ ≥ max
j,i
ψX j (X j ))1[Xi<ψ −1Xi (0)]
)
When the X j ’s are independent of each other and we pick ϵ = 0 we get
lim
ϵ→0U
Myerson
i (βthresh)(ϵ) −UMyersoni (βtruth)(ϵ) =
[∏
j,i
P(X j ≤ ψ−1j (0))
]
E
(
Xi1[Xi<ψ −1Xi (0)]
)
Going back to our work on second price auctions, the gain from thresholding in a continuous
manner at 0 was
U
Lazy
i (βthresh) −U Lazyi (βtruth) = E
(
XG(t0(X ))1[X ≤ψ −1(0)]
)
.
In this case, t0(x) = ψ−1(0)(1 − F (ψ−1(0)))/(1 − F (x)), G(x) = FK−1(x) using symmetry and inde-
pendence. As we’ve seen above,
U
Myerson
i (βthresh) −UMyersoni (βtruth) = E
(
X1[X ≤ψ −1(0)]
)
FK−1(ψ−1(0)) = E
(
X1[X ≤ψ −1(0)]
)
G(ψ−1(0)) .
Now since t0(x) ≤ ψ−1(0), we see that in the symmetric case, for the 1-strategic player we have
extra gainMyerson ≥ extra gainsecond price ,
since G(ψ−1(0)) ≥ G(t0(x)) when x ≤ ψ−1(0).
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Of course, in the symmetric case, the truthful revenue is the same in the Myerson and 2nd price
lazy auction. As such the relative gain is also higher in the Myerson auction than in the second
price auction. □
Example: K symmetric bidders, unif[0,1] distribution, 1 strategic. In this case, ψ−1i (0) = 1/2,∫ 1/2
0 x f (x)dx =
∫ 1/2
0 xdx = 1/8. And
∏
j,i P(X j ≤ ψ−1j (0)) = 2−(K−1). The truthful revenue/utility
is the same as in a 2nd price auction with reserve at 1/2. Elementary computations show that this
utility is
∫ 1
1/2 x
K−1 − xKdx = (1 − (K + 2)/2K+1)/(K(K + 1)).
Numerics for K = 2. When K = 2, the utility is 1/12 in the truthful case. And the extra utility is
1/16, i.e. 75% of the utility in the truthful case. Hence the utility of the shaded strategy is 7/48. We
note that the gain is even larger than for a 2nd price auction with monopoly reserve where the
extra utility was 57%
Remarks about the asymmetric case. In the asymmetric case, it becomes harder to make a relative
comparison of gains. That is because the truthful revenue in Myerson and 2nd price auctions are
different. Furthemore, for the extra gain, even if X j ’s are independent, we have to compare
E
(
Xi1[Xi ≤ψ −1i (0)]
∏
j,i
Fj (ψ−1j (0))
)
and E
(
Xi1[Xi ≤ψ −1i (0)]
∏
j,i
Fj
(
ψ−1i (0)(1 − Fi (ψ−1i (0)))
1 − Fi (Xi )
))
In general, the comparison seem like it could go either way. An exception is the caseψ−1j (0) ≥ ψ−1i (0)
for all j , i: then the extra revenue in the Myerson auction is greater than the extra revenue in the
second price auction.
H.2 Thresholding at the monopoly price in the eager second price auction with
monopoly price
Lemma 10. Consider the one-strategic setting with FXi the value distribution of the strategic bidder
i that we assume regular. The K-1 other bidders have the same value distribution than bidder i and bid
truthfully. Lets not βtruth the truthful strategy and βthresh the thresholded strategy at the monopoly
price. The utility of the truthful bidder in the Myerson auctionUMyersoni and in the lazy second price
auctionU Lazyi verifies
U
Eaдer
i (βthresh) −U Eaдeri (βtruth) ≥ U Lazyi (βthresh) −U Lazyi (βtruth)
Proof. The proof is very similar to the previous one. We recall that in the eager version of the
second price auction, the winner of the auction is the bidder with the highest bid among bidders
who clear their reserve price and she pays the maximum between the second highest bid and her
reserve price.
To complete the proof, we need to remark that in the symmetric case, the utility of the strategic
bidder in the eager second price auction is
U
Eager
i (β) = E
(
(Xi −ψBi (Bi ))Gi (β(Xi ))1[Bi ≥maxj,i (psi−1Bj (0))]
)
.
with Gi the distribution of the highest bid of the competition above their reserve price. As we are
in the symmetric case and all the bidders different than i are bidding truthfully:
∀x ∈ [0,ψ−1X (0)],Gi (x) = FK−1X (ψ−1X (0)) .
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Hence,
U
Eager
i (βthresh) −U Lazyi (βlazy) = E
(
X
(
FK−1X (ψ−1FX (0)) − FK−1X (x)
)
1[X ≤ψ −1FX (0)]
)
≥ 0
□
I OPTIMIZATION AND THRESHOLDING THE VIRTUAL VALUE
I.1 The problem
I.1.1 General form. Let us call r the current reserve price. It could be e.g. the monopoly price. We
call
hβ (x) = β(x) − β ′(x)1 − F (x)
f (x) = ψB (β(x)) .
We note as before that f (x)hβ (x) = (β(x)(F (x) − 1))′.
We want to find a strategy β (which is increasing and continuous, say) such that we
max
β
E
((X −ψB (β(X )))G(β(X ))1[X ≥0])
under the constraints that
∀r0 ≤ r ,дr0 (β) = E
(
ψB (β(X ))G(β(X ))1[r0≤X ≤r ]
) ≤ 0
E
(
ψB (β(X ))G(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
= 0 .
The objective is the utility of the bidder. Note that the constraints mean that the maximum of
the seller revenue below r is achieved for a reserve value of 0 and that this extra revenue is 0. As
such our objective is correct under those constraints, since the constraint enforce the fact that we
optimize over functions for which a welfare benevolent seller puts the reserve value at 0. Note that
the thresholding-the-virtual-value strategy satisfies the constraints, so the set of function we are
considering is not empty. Technically, the max above may have to be replaced by a sup, but this is
the type of technical problems (verifying that a sup is attained and is indeed a max) that we leave
aside in this not completely rigorous discussion.
I.1.2 Restriction to continuous strategies with truthful bidding beyond r . Let us limit ourselves to
truthful bidding beyond r , with continuous bidding at r . Hence, our problem becomes to find a
function β on [0, r ] with β(r ) = r such that we
max
β
F (β) = E ((X − hβ (X ))G(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]) ,
subject to
β(r ) = r ,
∀0 ≤ r0 ≤ r , gr0 (β) = −E
(
ψB (β(X ))G(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r0]
)
= −E (hβ (X )G(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r0]) ≤ 0 ,
and gr (β) = 0
I.2 Reminders on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
We first recall the standard KKT conditions in a finite dimensional space: if we try to
max
x
f (x) s.t дi (x) ≤ 0 , 1 ≤ i ≤ m , ej (x) = 0 , 1 ≤ j ≤ K
if λi are Lagrange/KKT multipliers, we have at the optimum
∇f (x∗) =
m∑
i=1
λ∗i∇дi (x∗) +
K∑
j=1
κ∗j∇ej (x∗) = 0 .
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and by complementary slackness
λ∗iдi (x∗) = 0∀i .
Recall also that we need λ∗i ≥ 0 but there are no constraints on κ∗j . These are necessary conditions.
Many results extend the KKT conditions to infinite dimensional spaces with either finitely
many or infinitely many variables. See for instance [9, 12, 16]. We rely on [33] who generalize the
standard KKT formulation to Hilbert spaces. Somewhat unfortunately, this introduces a heavy load
of technical requirements. We do not address all of them in this Appendix.
The salient feature is that under technical conditions on the constraints (see [33]), the KKT
conditions extend pretty much as is by replacing the positive Lagrange multipliers associated with
inequality constraints by positive measures.
A natural space to work in is the Sobolev spaceW 1,2[0, r ] = H 1[0, r ] which are functions γ
such that γ and γ ′ are in L2[0, r ] (see [33] p.13 and references therein for more information about
H 1). H 1 is a Hilbert space, with the dot product (γ ,ν )H 1 =
∫
[0,r ] γ (x)ν (x)dx +
∫
[0,r ] γ
′(x)ν ′(x)dx .
As mentioned in [33] all the elements of H 1[0, r ] are absolutely continuous, hence they have a
derivative almost everywhere and can be written as integrals of their derivatives. We will therefore
use integration by parts formulae.
To avoid a number of issues arising in connection with making explicit the gradient in H 1 of
the functionals we consider, we will work throughout with the variation, i.e. the evaluation of the
gradient in a certain direction.
Now we turn to compute our directional derivatives/gradients to be able to explicit the first order
conditions, i.e. the equivalent of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions in our context . In the next
few subsections we will argue the following.
NRResult 1. Assume we can proceed formally and treat λi ’s in the standard KKT formulation as
density of a positive measure on [0, r ] in our setting.
We suppose that F , the value distribution of the strategic bidder, is a regular distribution. Furthermore
f > 0, continuous on [0, r ]. G, the distribution of the maximum bid of the competition, is assumed to
be continuous, to have a positive density on [0, r ], and G > 0 on (0, r ). For simplicity, we also assume
that F and G are compactly supported.
Then, to cancel the generalized Lagrangian, the first order conditions evaluated in the direction
of the function ρ, (i.e. considering the limit of the functionals of interest at β + tρ as t → 0 in our
problem) give
E
(
1[0≤X ≤r ]Xρ(X )д(β(X ))
)
(11)
= E
( [
hρ (X )G(β(X )) + hβ (X )ρ(X )д(β(X ))
]
1[0≤X ≤r ]
(
1 −
∫ r
X
λ(r0)dr0
))
+ κ∗
{
ρ(x)(F (x) − 1)G(β(x))|r0 + E
(
ρ(X )β(X )д(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)}
(12)
Calling Λ(x) = 1 −
∫ r
x λ(y)dy, this can be rewritten as
E
(
ρ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]д(β(X )) [X − (Λ(X ) + κ∗)β(X )]
)
=
E
(
ρ(X )G(β(X )))λ(X ) [X −ψF (X )] 1[0≤X ≤r ]
) − G(β(x))(1 − F (x))(Λ(x) + κ∗)ρ(x)|r0 . (13)
To satisfy this equation for all ρ with ρ(r ) = 0 at a given β requires κ∗ = −Λ(0) and
λ(x) = д(β(x))
G(β(x))
f (x)
1 − F (x)
[
x − β(x)
∫ x
0
λ(y)dy
]
, λ(x) ≥ 0 .
We finally assume thatψF (x) = x − (1 − F (x))/f (x) < 0 on [0, r ], i.e. r is picked to be the monopoly
price. Then
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(1) the thresholding function β∗(x) = r (1 − F (r ))/(1 − F (x)) satisfies the KKT necessary conditions
as above with λ > 0. We provide an explicit form for λ in the proof.
(2) if another feasible function β has λ = 0 or Λ constant on an interval (i.e ∃[a,b] such that the
extra expected seller revenue if s/he sets the reserve price anywhere in this this interval would be
non-zero) this interval is of the form [0,b]. In this case, g0(β) < gb (β) ≤ 0, which shows that β
cannot satisfy the equality constraint g0(β) = 0.
The arguments leading to the previous statements are not fully rigorous, as our arguments
proceed formally, without checking that various pathologies do not occur. This step would be
necessary to make all of our derivations below rigorous. We would also need to check that various
compactness conditions for sets of gradients (which are hence sets of functions in H 1) are also
satisfied to be apply to rigorously use the KKT formulation in [33]. We have not done so in general.
However, it is tr
Now we turn to compute our directional derivatives/gradients to be able to investigate KKT style
conditions.
I.3 Gradient computations and argument for NRResult 1
I.3.1 Gradient computation for equality constraint. Recall the equality constraint
Cβ = E
(
hβ (X )G(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
= 0 .
Taking its derivative when βt = β + tρ gives
∂
∂t
Cβt = E
(
1[0≤X ≤r ]ρ(X )
[
G(β(X )) + hβ (X )д(β(X ))
] )
− E
(
1[0≤X ≤r ]ρ ′(X )1 − F (X )
f (X ) G(β(X ))
)
Integrating by parts the second expectation we get
−E
(
1[0≤X ≤r ]ρ ′(X )1 − F (X )
f (X ) G(β(X ))
)
= −
∫ r
0
ρ ′(x)(1 − F (x))G(β(x))dx
= ρ(x)(F (x) − 1)G(β(x))|r0 − E
(
ρ(X )[G(β(X )) + (hβ − β(X ))д(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
So that
∂
∂t
Cβt = ρ(x)(F (x) − 1)G(β(x))|r0 + E
(
ρ(X )β(X )д(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
,
= ρ(0)G(β(0)) + E (ρ(X )β(X )д(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]) .
Here we have used the continuity constraint βt (r ) = r and hence ρ(r ) = 0 for all ρ.
I.3.2 Gradient computations and dealing with inequality constraints. Recall that if βt = β + tρ,
hβt = hβ + thρ .
So
∂
∂t
F (βt ) = E
(
1[0≤r ][−hρG(β(X )) + (X − hβ (X ))ρ(X )д(β(X ))]
)
.
Also,
∂
∂t
gr0 (βt ) = −
∫ r0
0
[
hρ (x)G(β(x)) + hβ (x)ρ(x)д(β(x))
]
f (x)dx .
On the other hand, using formally [33] we replace the sum of the gradient of the multipliers in
the classical formulation by an integral. Let λ(r0) be “the Lagrange multiplier" associated with r0
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(more precisely, the Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to Lebesgue measure on [0, r ] of the
associated positive measure).
We have, as analog of the sum of the gradients in the discrete case,∫ r
0
λ(r0) ∂
∂t
gr0 (βt )dr0 = −
∫ r
0
∫ r
0
λ(r0)dr0[hρ (x)G(β(x))
+ hβ (x)ρ(x)д(β(x))]f (x)dx
= −
∫ r
0
[hρ (x)G(β(x))
+ hβ (x)ρ(x)д(β(x))]f (x)
(∫ r
x
λ(r0)dr0
)
dx .
Hence to have the generalized Lagrangian equal to zero, the first order conditions give
−E
( [
hρ (X )G(β(X )) + hβ (X )ρ(X )д(β(X ))
]
1[0≤X ≤r ]
(∫ r
X
λ(r0)dr0
))
+κ∗
{
ρ(x)(F (x) − 1)G(β(x))|r0 + E
(
ρ(X )β(X )д(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)}
=
E
(
1[0≤X ≤r ]Xρ(X )д(β(X ))
) − E (1[0≤X ≤r ][hρG(β(X )) + hβ (X )ρ(X )д(β(X ))])
This can be rewritten as
E
(
1[0≤X ≤r ]Xρ(X )д(β(X ))
)
(14)
= E
( [
hρ (X )G(β(X )) + hβ (X )ρ(X )д(β(X ))
]
1[0≤X ≤r ]
(
1 −
∫ r
X
λ(r0)dr0
))
+ κ∗
{
ρ(x)(F (x) − 1)G(β(x))|r0 + E
(
ρ(X )β(X )д(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)}
(15)
This is how we arrive at the first part of NRTheorem 1.
I.3.3 Simplifications. Let us now simplify this expression. Let us work on the top part of the right
hand side, using integration by parts again to simplify the expression. Let us call
Λ(x) = 1 −
∫ r
x
λ(y)dy .
Note that Λ′(x) = λ(x). Let
Γ = E
(
G(β(X ))hρ (X )Λ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
= E
(
G(β(X ))ρ(X )Λ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]
) − ∫ r
0
G(β(x))ρ ′(x)(1 − F (x))Λ(x)dx
Using integration by parts, we have∫ r
0
G(β(x))ρ ′(x)(1 − F (x))Λ(x)dx = G(β(x))(1 − F (x))Λ(x)ρ(x)|r0 −∫ r
0
ρ(x)[β ′(x)д(β(x))(1 − F (x))Λ(x) − f (x)G(β(x))Λ(x) +G(β(x))(1 − F (x))λ(x)]dx
= G(β(x))(1 − F (x))Λ(x)ρ(x)|r0 + E
(
ρ(X )G(β(X ))Λ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
−E
(
ρ(X )д(β(X ))β ′(X )1 − F (X )
f (X ) Λ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
− E
(
ρ(X )G(β(X ))1 − F (X )
f (X ) λ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
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Of course,
−β ′(x)1 − F (x)
f (x) = hβ (x) − β(x) and −
1 − F (x)
f (x) = ψF (x) − x .
Hence, ∫ r
0
G(β(x))ρ ′(x)(1 − F (x))Λ(x)dx
= G(β(x))(1 − F (x))Λ(x)ρ(x)|r0 + E
(
ρ(X )G(β(X ))Λ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
+E
(
д(β(X ))ρ(X )Λ(x)1[0≤X ≤r ](hβ (X ) − β(X ))
)
+E
(
λ(X )ρ(X )G(β(X ))) [ψF (X ) − X ] 1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
.
We conclude that
Γ =
E
(
ρ(X )д(β(X ))Λ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ][β(X ) − hβ (X )]
)
+ E
(
ρ(X )G(β(X )))λ(X ) [X −ψF (X )] 1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
− G(β(x))(1 − F (x))Λ(x)ρ(x)|r0
With our new notations, Equation (14) reads
E
(
1[0≤X ≤r ]Xρ(X )д(β(X ))
)
= Γ + E
( [
hβ (X )ρ(X )д(β(X ))
]
1[0≤X ≤r ]Λ(X )
)
+κ∗
{
ρ(x)(F (x) − 1)G(β(x))|r0 + E
(
ρ(X )β(X )д(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)}
Using our integration by parts results, Equation (14) becomes
E
(
ρ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]д(β(X )) [X − Λ(X )β(X )]
)
=
E
(
ρ(X )G(β(X )))λ(X ) [X −ψF (X )] 1[0≤X ≤r ]
) − G(β(x))(1 − F (x))Λ(x)ρ(x)|r0
+κ∗ ρ(x)(F (x) − 1)G(β(x))|r0 + κ∗E
(
ρ(X )β(X )д(β(X ))1[0≤X ≤r ]
)
or
E
(
ρ(X )1[0≤X ≤r ]д(β(X )) [X − (Λ(X ) + κ∗)β(X )]
)
=
E
(
ρ(X )G(β(X )))λ(X ) [X −ψF (X )] 1[0≤X ≤r ]
) − G(β(x))(1 − F (x))(Λ(x) + κ∗)ρ(x)|r0 (16)
This is the second part of NRResult 1, i.e. Equation (13) there.
I.4 Exploiting Equation (13)
Continuity of bid function and implication We want the bid function to be continuous. As
mentioned earlier, this requires ρ(r ) = 0. Hence
− G(β(x))(1 − F (x))(Λ(x) + κ∗)ρ(x)|r0 = G(β(0))(Λ(0) + κ∗)ρ(0)
Setting the value for κ∗ It is rather clear we will take κ∗ = −Λ(0). Indeed this cancels the term
in G(β(0))(Λ(0) + κ∗)ρ(0) no matter what the value of ρ(0) is.
Now to guarantee equality in Equation (16) we can just equate the terms under the expectations
(for all ρ). This gives the differential representation for our Lagrange/KKT multipliers
λ(x) = д(β(x))
G(β(x))
f (x)
1 − F (x) [x − (Λ(x) − Λ(0))β(x)] .
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Note that Λ(x) − Λ(0) =
∫ x
0 λ(y)dy. In other words, we need to solve for λ such that
λ(x) = д(β(x))
G(β(x))
f (x)
1 − F (x)
[
x − β(x)
∫ x
0
λ(y)dy
]
. (17)
That would guarantee that the optimality conditions are satisfied. Since λ = Λ′, this is nothing but
a first order ODE in Λ.
I.4.1 On the solutions of Equation (17) and its solution for the thresholded virtual value.
And indeed, this is just a first order differential equation in
L(x) =
∫ x
0
λ(y)dy .
Looking at the equation it’s clear that if we can solve it, λ is pretty much gonna be positive... The
first order ODE reads
L′(x) = д(β(x))
G(β(x))
f (x)
1 − F (x) [x − β(x)L(x)] .
We note further that for the thresholded virtual value, i.e β(x) = r (1 − F (r ))/(1 − F (x)),
д(β(x))
G(β(x))
f (x)
1 − F (x)β(x) =
д(β(x))
G(β(x))β
′(x) = [logG(β(x))]′
so the equation reads
L′(x) =m(x) − [logG(β(x))]′ L(x) .
The generic solution of this equation is
L(x) = C(x)
G(β(x))
where
C ′(x) =m(x)G(β(x)) = xд(β(x)) f (x)1 − F (x) .
Note we are interested in the particular solution that has L(0) = 0. Calling
C0(x) =
∫ x
0
yд(β(y)) f (y)1 − F (y)dy ,
we are interested in the solution
L(x) = C0(x)
G(β(x)) .
We see that if x − L(x)β(x) , 0
L′(x)
x − L(x)β(x) =
д(β(x))
G(β(x))
f (x)
1 − F (x) .
The only thing to verify is that with β(x) = r (1−F (r ))1−F (x ) , we can pick λ > 0 that solves the above
Equation (17). The question is hence whether L′(x) > 0 which amounts to showing that
x − L(x)β(x) > 0 on (0, r ) when β(x) = r (1 − F (r ))1 − F (x) .
The condition
x − L(x)β(x) > 0 on (0, r ) when β(x) = r (1 − F (r ))1 − F (x)
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reads alternatively, based on the work done above,
xG(β(x)) > C0(x)β(x) = β(x)
∫ x
0
yд(β(y)) f (y)1 − F (y)dy ,∀0 < x < r .
With β(x) = r (1 − F (r ))/(1 − F (x)), we have
β(x)
∫ x
0
yд(β(y)) f (y)1 − F (y)dy =
r (1 − F (r ))
1 − F (x)
∫ x
0
yд(β(y))(1 − F (y)) β
′(y)
r (1 − F (r ))dy
=
1
1 − F (x)
∫ x
0
yд(β(y))(1 − F (y))β ′(y)dy
=
1
1 − F (x)
[
xG(β(x))(1 − F (x))|r0 +
∫ x
0
G(β(x))f (x)ψF (x)dx
]
= xG(β(x)) + 11 − F (x)
∫ x
0
G(β(x))f (x)ψF (x)dx .
Hence our condition x − L(x)β(x) > 0 on (0, r ) when β(x) = r (1−F (r ))1−F (x ) now reads∫ x
0
G(β(x))f (x)ψF (x)dx < 0 ,∀0 < x < r .
And that is obviously true for r the monopoly price sinceψF < 0 by our assumptions.
I.4.2 Can we have λ = 0 on an interval [a,b]? Recall that by “complimentary slackness" this
would mean that the extra seller revenue is not equal to zero on that interval. In other words, if
the seller set the reserve value to be any point in this interval [a,b], s/he would have a non-zero
change to their expected revenue as compared to setting the reserve value at the monopoly price.
This implies that L defined as
L(x) =
∫ x
0
λ(y)dy .
is constant on that interval. Going back to Equation (17) we see that this implies that for β , which
we of course assume to be feasible, β(x) = x/d , where d = L(a) = L(b) > 0 is a positive constant,
which depends only on b, on this interval, provided д(β(x)) , 0. Note that this implies that
hβ (x) = ψF (x)/d < 0 on this interval under our assumptions onψF .
Now when β is in H 1, it is absolutely continuous, hence continuous, and the seller revenue
on [t , r ] is a continuous function of t : this can be seen by re-writing the bidder’s payment as
E
(
max(Y , t)1[β (X )≥max (Y ,t )]
)
, where Y is the maximum bid of the competition.
The fact that hβ < 0 on the interval implies that the seller revenue is strictly increasing on
[a,b]. So if we call дt (β) the extra expected seller revenue when the reserve value is set at t , i.e.
дt (β) =
∫ r
t ψB (β(x))G(β(x))f (x)dx , we have
∀t ∈ [a,b] ,дt (β) =
∫ b
t
ψF (x)
d
G(x/d)f (x)dx + дb (β) .
Hence the revenue of the seller is strictly increasing on [a,b]. Hence,
дa(β) < дb (β) .
Now since β is feasible, we know that дb (β) ≤ 0, so that дa(β) < 0. Since дt (β) is continuous as a
function of t , we can find a′ < a, such that дt (β) < 0 on (a′,b]. By the same argument, we have
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that on (a′,b], β(x) = x/d = x/L(b), the revenue of the seller is decreasing and using continuity of
дt , and we have
дa′(β) = lim
t→a′
∫ b
t
ψF (x)
d
G(x/d)f (x)dx + дb (β) =
∫ b
a′
ψF (x)
d
G(x/d)f (x)dx + дb (β) < дb (β) .
This implies that λ = 0 on [a′,b] since дt (β) < 0 on [a′,a]. Repeating the argument, we get a
decreasing sequence an such that λ = 0 on [an ,b]. As an is decreasing and 0 ≤ an ≤ b, an has a
limit. Call it a∞. We claim that a∞ = 0. If it were not the case, the same argument as above shows
that we could find c < a∞ such that λ = 0 on [c,b].
As λ = 0 on [0,b], we have
д0(β) =
∫ b
0
ψF (x)
d
G(x/d)f (x)dx + дb (β) < дb (β) ≤ 0 .
The last inequality comes from the fact that β is feasible, so дb (β) ≤ 0. But recall that our equality
constraint is that д0(β) = 0 for β to be feasible. This is a contradiction.
Note that the above argument relies mostly on properties of the measure L(x) =
∫ x
0 λ(x)dx (we
could rephrase the results about λ = 0 on [a′,b] into saying that L is constant on [a′,b]) and not so
much on properties of the Radon-Nikodym derivative λ, and so it might be possible to turn it to a
fully rigorous argument.
